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INTERPRETATION AND INSTITUTIONS
Cass R. Sunstein* and A drian Vermeule**

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the
introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes
cancer" in human beings or animals. ' Suppose that new technolo
gies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many
potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is
often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with
governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally,
that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into
food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging
that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were
applied, it would prove absurd and fail to promote the legislative
purpose, which is to make food safer. In response, the government
argues that the statute must be interpreted literally and that all ad
ditives that "cause cancer" are banned. How should the court
resolve the dispute?
Such questions are pervasive. But we think that current
theories of legal interpretation fail to provide an adequate frame
work for thinking about them, and that the failure reveals a serious
problem with contemporary claims about interpretation in law.
Typically, interpretive issues are debated at a high level of abstrac
tion, by asking questions about the nature of interpretation, or by
making large claims about democracy, legitimacy, authority, and
constitutionalism.2 But most of the time, large-scale claims of these
kinds cannot rule out any reasonable view about interpretation.
For example, it is impossible to deduce from such large-scale
claims an answer to a dispute about the meaning of the phrase
"cause cancer," or indeed an answer to any of the current ques* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University
of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science.
** Professor of Law, University of Chicago. - Ed. For valuable comments, we are
grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Rick Pildes, Eric Posner, Richard Posner. Geoffrey Stone .
David Weisbach, and workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School.

1. This is a modest variation on an actual case. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831
F.2d 1 108 (D.C. Cir. 1 987).

2. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1985) (emphasizing "integrity" as a princi
ple of legitimacy): John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Stalllte, IOI
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36-52 (2001 ) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism) (emphasizing con
stitutional ideals); Frank Michelman, A BriefAnatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism.
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999) (invoking the idea of democracy).
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tions about how to approach a statutory or constitutional text. Part
of our goal here is to demonstrate the futility of efforts to show
that abstract ideals can resolve disagreements about appropriate
interpretive methods.
By contrast, we urge that it is far more promising to focus on
two neglected issues. The first has to do with institutional capaci
ties. As we shall urge, debates over legal interpretation cannot be
sensibly resolved without attention to those capacities. The central
question is not "how, in principle, should a text be interpreted?"
The question instead is "how should certain institutions, with their
distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts?" If the
relevant judges can reliably decide whether a literal interpretation
of a statutory term is absurd, the argument for rejecting literalism
is greatly strengthened; if the relevant j udges are highly fallible,
literalism may have some overlooked virtues. A great deal turns as
well on the attentiveness of the relevant legislature; the appro
priate stance toward interpretation is not the same in a system with
an attentive legislative as in a system with an inattentive one. The
second issue involves the dynamic effects of any particular ap
proach - its consequences for private and public actors of various
sorts. If a nonliteral interpretation of the phrase "induce cancer"
would introduce a great deal of uncertainty into the system and
reduce Congress's incentive to make corrections, it might well be
sensible to deny exceptions in cases involving trivial risks. By
drawing attention to both institutional capacities and dynamic ef
fects, we are suggesting the need for a kind of institutional turn in
thinking about interpretive issues.
With an emphasis on institutional capacities and dynamic
effects, we will be able to see that nearly all of the most prominent
discussions of interpretation - including, for example, those by
Jeremy Bentham, William Blackstone, H.L.A. Hart, Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks, Ronald Dworkin, William Eskridge, John
Manning, and Richard Posner - are incomplete and unsuccessful,
simply because they generally proceed as if the only question is
how "we" should interpret a text. Where they attend to institu
tional roles at all, these theorists frequently work with an ideal
ized, even heroic picture of judicial capacities and, as a corollary, a
jaundiced view of the capacities of other lawmakers and interpret
ers, such as agencies and legislatures. And if the spotlight is placed
on institutional capacities and dynamic effects, we will find it much
easier to understand what underlies many interpretive disagree
ments in law, and also to see how such disagreements might be
resolved.3
3. We deliberately paint here with a broad brush. Some of the authors mentioned
are occasionally attentive to institutional issues; we discuss them in greater detail below.
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Of course the Court is often aware of its institutional limita
tions, especially but not exclusively in the constitutional domain.
The high deference usually reflected in "rationality review"
represents a recognition that courts might misunderstand the facts,
and that when the facts are unclear, judgments of value should be
made politically, not j udieially.4 When the Court refused to subject
racially discriminatory effects to heightened scrutiny, it relied in
part on the institutional problems that would be created by that
scrutiny.5 The Court's reluctance to use the nondelegation doctrine
seems to be rooted, in part, in the institutional concern that courts
could not draw sensible lines between permitted and prohibited
delegations.6 The Court refused to forbid sex discrimination in
registration for the draft, not by endorsing sex discrimination as
such, but by urging that this was a context in which Congress and
the President deserved particular respect.7 Arguments about judi
cial administrability and certainty have played a role in statutory
interpretation as well.8 Our claim here is not that the Supreme
Court, or courts generally, ignore the institutional dimension, but
that consideration of that dimension remains episodic and occa
sional, and that more general theorizing about interpretation pays
too little attention to it.
Consider, for example, the view, often labeled "formalistic,"
which sees legitimate interpretation as requiring fidelity to the
ordinary meaning of the relevant text when originally enacted.9
Formalism is rejected by those who insist that legitimate interpre
tation includes a variety of devices designed to ensure that sense,
rather than nonsense, is made of the law.10 Many opponents of
formalism urge, correctly, that devices of this kind are simply a
part of how communication often works. 11 But under certain
assumptions, formalism might be seen not as embodying an em4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
5. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
6. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But
while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegatipn is a fundamental element of our con
stitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.").
7. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981 ).
8. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Origina/ism in Recent
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate
and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1998).
9. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-25 (1998); Manning,
Textualism, supra note 2, at 36-52.
10. See DWORKIN, supra note 2: William N. Eskridge, Jr., All Abolll Words: Early
Understandings of the "ltulicial Power" in Statlllory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 990 (200 1 ) [hereinafter Eskridge, All About Words].
1 1. See William
REV. 609 (1 990).

N.

Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Stattttory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L.
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barrassingly crude understanding of communication, but as a sen
sible and highly pragmatic response to institutional limits of gener
alist judges and institutional capacities of Congress. We believe
that in considering these debates, an institutional focus is helpful,
not because it always resolves them, but because it shows what
many disputes are really about, and because it casts light on cen
tral questions that might otherwise be obscured. At a minimum,
we urge that an appreciation of institutional capacities and dy
namic effects is a necessary part of any theory of legal interpreta
tion. A theory that neglects those issues is seriously incomplete.
We also hope that future debates about interpretation will focus
on institutional issues, where it remains possible to make a great
deal of progress, not least by examining empirical issues, identified
below, on which much remains to be learned.
Why have modern interpretive theories neglected institutional
issues? This is a large question, and we do not offer a full answer
here; but we do have some speculations. Because of their own role,
judges themselves naturally ask a particular question ("How is this
text best interpreted?"), and that question naturally diverts atten
tion from the issue of institutional capacities. Legal education, and
the legal culture more generally, invite interpreters to ask the fol
lowing role-assuming question: "If you were the j udge, how would
you interpret this text?" If the question is posed in that way, insti
tutional issues drop out. The very form of the question makes
them irrelevant. Academic observers, usually specialists in the
subject at hand, often deplore judicial decisions as "wooden" or
"formalistic," without appreciating the risk that generalist judges,
unmoored from the text, might do even worse. Indeed it is possible
that specialized interpreters should reject formalism but that
nonspecialists should embrace it;12 and academic specialists are
unlikely to appreciate this point. Our principal goal here is to pose
the question of interpretation in a form that will sidestep these
role-related and cognitive traps, enabling interpretive theory to
highlight the neglected issues.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I is a catalogue of in
fluential work on interpretation. We detail the pervasive indiffer
ence in that work to institutional issues and also explain how that
indifference has weakened the resulting analysis. We attempt to
draw out the neglected questions in a way that will help show the
range of variables that bear on the selection of interpretive strate
gies by generalist judges.
1 2. There are of course disputes about who counts as a specialist. Some courts.
moreover, include specialists rather than generalists; consider the tax court and federal
bankruptcy judges. It may well be that the appropriate interpretive stance for such spe
cialists is different from that for generalist judges.
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Part II responds to an obvious challenge to our claim: that
j udgments about institutional issues cannot be helpful without
some kind of background normative account of interpretation. A
second-best approach, one that asks about interpretive mistakes
and dynamic effects, necessarily presupposes some first-best
account. This is an important observation, and in a sense it is
unexceptionable. But it fails to engage our central point, which is
not that a first-best account is worthless or irrelevant, but that it is
incomplete without a second-best account that takes account of
institutional ·issues. Institutional analysis is necessary to the choice
of interpretive rules, even if it is insufficient. In any case, we also
offer a further, more ambitious claim: institutional analysis may
indeed be sufficient in some settings, because it may allow inter
preters who hold different commitments to converge on particular
interpretive rules while bracketing disagreements about their
preferred first-best accounts.
Part III shows how a range of issues in public law might be
recast if institutional issues are brought to the forefront. We sug
gest that a formalist or textualist approach to statutes might be
most plausibly defended, not by controversial claims about the
Constitution or implausible claims about meaning, but through a
suggestion that this approach might produce the most sensible sys
tem of law, given the institutions that we actually have. We are
confident that the standard defenses of formalism based on first
principles are very weak; the same can be said for many of the
standard challenges to formalism, also based on first principles.
We also urge that even if courts should follow the ordinary mean
ing of text, it is reasonable to suggest that administrative agencies
need not, in part because agencies are specialists rather than gen
eralists. Compared to courts, agencies are likely to have a good
sense of whether a departure from formalism will seriously
damage a regulatory scheme; hence it is appropriate to allow agen
cies a higher degree of interpretive flexibility.
Moving beyond statutory interpretation, Part III applies the in
stitutional lens to issues of constitutional interpretation and the in
terpretation of common law precedents. We explain how attention
to institutional issues might shift the debate over competing meth
ods of constitutional interpretation, making it necessary to ask
some infrequently posed questions about judicial capacity to im
plement various approaches. Although constitutional theory has
become increasingly sophisticated about large-scale institutional
questions, such as the allocation of lawmaking authority between
legislatures and courts, it has continued to neglect the role of insti
tutional considerations in the theory of constitutional interpreta
tion py judges. Our analysis provides the tools needed to repair
this flaw. Finally, we offer a brief note about the common law,
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suggesting that similar institutional variables very much bear on
the appropriate interpretation of judicial precedents.
In these and other cases, our goal is not to settle on any par
ticular view about what interpretation should entail, but to suggest
that it is impossible to answer that question without looking at the
institutional capacities of various actors and the dynamic effects of
competing approaches. We claim, in short, that a focus on institu
tional issues radically reframes the analysis of legal interpretation
- and that it is long past time for those interested in interpreta
tion to see what might be done with that reframing.
I.

INTERPRETATION WITHOUT IN STITUTIONS:

A CATALO G U E

Here we supply a panoramic tour of interpretive theory, and
influential theorists, from three periods: the English debate over
common law approaches to statutory interpretation (Section A),
the formative era of modem interpretive theory (Section B), and
contemporary accounts (Section C) . Our limited objective is to
document the blindness or insensitivity to institutional considera
tions that pervades these theorists' work. We make no pretense of
supplying a complete and adequately nuanced intellectual history
of interpretive theory. Indeed, our catalogue will have the flavor of
Whig History, praising theorists who anticipate the institutional
turn and (far more often) condemning those who do not. But our
goal is not merely critical. By exploring what has been neglected,
we hope to make some movement toward the task, ventured in
Parts II and III, of isolating the issues that must be faced by an ap
proach to interpretation that is concerned with institutional capaci
ties and dynamic effects.13
A.

Common Law Interp retation and Bentham's Mistake

We begin with Blackstone and Bentham, the foremost propo
nent and critic, respectively, of the common law approach to statu
tory interpretation. This approach has many shades and variants,
which license varying degrees of j udicial freedom in interpretation;
but a central or defining idea is that judges appropriately sensitive
to legislative purposes and to the surrounding fabric of law should
13. In what follows, we will put aside the possibility that doctrines of statutory in
terpretation might be legislated, rather than developed (solely) by j udges in common
Jaw fa shion. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
1 1 5 HARV. L. REV. 2086 (2002). Although the possibility is both important and inter
esting, past history shows that it is most unlikely that Congress will enact rules of inter
pretation that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice. For good
reason, the literature on statutory interpretation, both past and present, focuses on the
question of what interpretive rules judges should use absent legislative intervention;
that is our focus here as well.
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mold and shape statutes with something like the sensitivity and
flexibility accorded to j udicial precedents. In these respects, the
common law approach is a precursor of the legal process school
that came to dominate American interpretive theory after World
War 11. 1 4
Our critique, unsurprisingly, i s that the common law style o f in
terpretation presupposes a fanciful, even romantic account of judi
cial capacities, and also fails to ask questions about likely legis
lative responses to different j udicial approaches. We will see,
however, a major historical irony: Blackstone, the archetypal
common law interpreter, came far closer to recognizing the sup
pressed institutional questions, and the institutional case for for
malist statutory interpretation, than did Bentham, the common
law's principal critic. We will also see that later theorists, such as
H.L.A. Hart, followed Bentham rather than Blackstone, and hence
repeated Bentham's mistake.
Blackstone. William Blackstone's brief account of statutory in
terpretation in Book I of the Commentaries is easily the most
famous description of the common law style of statutory interpre
tation;15 Hart and Sacks featured it prominently in the legal
process materials that influenced a generation of leading academic
theorists.16 For Blackstone, the object of interpretation is to
uncover the "will of the legislator" by "exploring his intentions" as
manifested in "signs the most natural and probable."17 Despite this
ceremonial bow to legislative supremacy, the discussion quickly
turns from the words of the statute, of surrounding statutes, and
the subject matter, to more fluid interpretive sources, particularly
the "reason and spirit" of the law and the Aristotelian principle of
"equity" - the latter being the power "of excepting those circum
stances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself
would have excepted."18 Interpretive equity, on this view,
"depend[s], essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each
individual case."19
Here are all the hallmarks of the common law interpretive
style: flexible treatment of statutory text, based on a nuanced sen
sitivity to legislative intentions or purposes and to the surrounding

1 4. See HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1 994).
1 5. See 1 WILLIAM B LACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *59-62.
16. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1 170.
1 7. 1 B LACKSTONE, supra note 1 5, at *59.
1 8. Id. at *61.
19. Id.
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fabric of the common law. Especially striking is the stylized as
sumption that interpretation according to the "reason" or "equity"
of the statute will capture the legislature's true intentions, or the
intentions that rational legislators would have had if informed
about the particular application at bar, as well as the accompany
ing insistence that equity is necessarily a particularistic or case
specific consideration. Under certain assumptions about institu
tional capacities, the common law style might well be best; but
Blackstone says nothing in defense of those assumptions, and fails
even to acknowledge them as such. The discussion, almost until
the very end, shows remarkably little awareness of several relevant
possibilities: that judges might mistake legislative purposes; that
they might do better by deferring to legislators' expressed judg
ments about equity than by enforcing their own; that they might,
by treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific benefits at
the price of increased uncertainty, imposing resulting burdens on
the interpretive system as a whole; that legislators, confronted with
j udges refusing to invoke purposes to make sense of text, might be
more careful in advance and might make corrections as the need
arises.
Consider, as one example among many, Blackstone's remarka
bly casual embrace of the "absurd-results" canon: the idea, in
Blackstone's words, that
where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if liter
ally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of
them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which
enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity,' was held after long debate not to extend to
the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the

fit.20
There is much to be said, pro and con, about interpretation to
avoid absurd results; the relevant institutional variables are
complex,21 and we shall say a fair bit about them here. What is im
portant for present purposes is Blackstone's radical institutional
blindness - his failure to identify those variables or to find them
even relevant. It may well be true that, if apprised of the surgeon's
case, the legislature would have provided a relevant exception. But
it hardly follows that the legislature would necessarily wish the
j udges to provide the exception themselves, given the legislature's
failure to do so. For many reasons, good and bad, the legislature
street with a

20. Id. at *60.
2 1 . See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A
Response fO Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 7 15 ( 1 992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Avoiding Regulawry Absurdity? A New Canon of Construclion, 32 ENVTL. LAW REP.
1 1 .1 26 (2002).
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might want to reserve to itself the authority to correct poorly
drafted statutes. Perhaps the legislature would pot trust the j udges'
j udgments about whether a result would be absurd; perhaps the
legislature would be willing to tolerate occasional absurdity for the
sake of clarity and predictability. Nor does it follow that, apart
from the question of legislative preferences about j udicial interpre
tation, the best overall interpretive system would be one in which
the judges possessed this case-specific power to modify seemingly
absurd statutory applications in light of purpose, reason, and
equity. To know whether that is true would require judgments
about a range of matters Blackstone fails to consider, such as the
rate of mistaken identification of absurd results and the ex ante ef�
fects of such a power on legislative drafting; more on these matters
below.
All this said, the end of Blackstone's discussion offers a
remarkable afterthought that, although barely sketched, antici
pates some critical questions for interpretive theory by acknowl
edging the role of second-best considerations.
[L]aw, without equity, tho' hard and disagreeable, is much more de
sirable for the public good, than equity without law; which would
make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion
[by producing] as many different rules of action laid down in our
courts, as there are differences of capacity and sentiment in the
human mind.22

In this passage "law," cast in opposition to equity, seems to
connote a formalist style of interpretation that enforces rules ap
·
parent on the face of statutory texts, rather than molding those
texts to background legal principles or attributed legislative pur
poses. The first-best, Blackstone is suggesting, would be law and
equity in an appropriate mix, distributed appropriately across
cases. But if the mix is unstable, if j udges must choose between
enforcing law in all cases or doing equity in all cases, then resolute
enforcement of statutory text is preferable on second-best
grounds.
On Blackstone's account, equity without law is defective on
two counts: it "makes every judge a legislator" and introduces an
unacceptable amount of uncertainty ("most infinite confusion")
into the interpretive system.23 The first point is a gesture towards
the separation of lawmaking power from adjudicative power; later
we will argue that this sort of appeal is unhelpful, because it is too
abstract to supply valid reasons for or against interpretive formal
ism. Far more impressive and significant is the second point,
22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 5, at *62.
23.

hi.

893

894

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:885

an early attempt to introduce institutional considerations and
ex ante effects into interpretive theory. We will see, however,
that Blackstone's passing insight proved infertile. Later theorists
largely ignored the significance of second-best considerations.
Bentham. It is illuminating to glance at the interpretive views
of Jeremy Bentham, an imposing critic of common law adj udica
tion in general and of Blackstone in particular. Bentham's critique
of Blackstone's Commentaries develops the claim that common
law adj udication is both incoherent and inconsistent with a ra
tional, meaning utilitarian, legal order. The positive side of
Bentham's program was the codification of utilitarian legal princi
ples, and more generally a consolidation and expansion of legisla
tion's domain that would bring clarity, certainty, and order to the
law. Increasingly precise and comprehensive codification would
ultimately cause adjudication itself to wither away, as citizens and
officials could simply consult the code to ascertain their legal rights
and duties. In the interim, however, Bentham was intermittently
aware that statutes would contain gaps, ambiguities, and generali
ties ill-adapted to specific cases - the usual sources of difficult in
terpretive questions. Bentham thus discussed interpretation on
several occasions, most prominently in the Comment on the
Commentaries, which contains two substantial chapters on the
"Interpretation of [L]aws" and the "[C]onstruction of [S]tatutes,"24
although it is fair to say that he nowhere presents a fully developed
account of statutory interpretation.
For our purposes the significance of Bentham's work on inter
pretation lies in his imperfect utilitarianism - his neglect of insti
tutional variables in discussing the judicial role. Despite his pierc
ing depiction of the sponginess of common law adj udication, which
he equated with arbitrary judicial tyranny, Bentham failed to
transpose his critique of judicial capacities to interpretive theory in
any consistent way. The chapters on interpretation and construc
tion in the Comment on the Commentaries manage both to
approve flexible, purposivist interpretation devoted to forwarding
legislative "ends," on the one hand, and on the other to mock the
pretensions of common law interpretation by emphasizing what
Bentham saw as the arbitrariness of j udicial claims about "reason"
and "equity." We see, for example, Bentham both supporting the
absurd-results canon on purposive grounds, in Blackstone's exam
ple of the surgeon prosecuted for "drawing blood" in the streets,i.�
24. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 89-1 17, 137-61 (J. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1 977)
[hereinafter BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES).
25. See id. at 1 1 1 . 1 60. Bentham sometimes intimates that he endorses purposivism
and the absurd-results canon only in cases of ambiguous statutory language. See, e.g. , id.
at 1 60. I t requires some work, however, to square that qualification with Blackstone's
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and also denying that the common law j udge's appeal to reason or
reasonableness is anything other than a statement of personal
"opinion." On the one hand, "reasonableness or unreasonableness
is nothing but conformity or nonconformity to . . . opinion."26 On
the other hand, "[t]he words of a legislator are no [sic] otherwise
to be regarded than inasmuch as they are expressive of his will."27
But these positions are in tension with each other. Recall that
Blackstone's argument for purposive, equitable interpretation as
sumed that reasonable legislators would have recognized the need
for an exception, if made aware of the application at hand.
Purposivism usually attributes goals or aims by envisioning rea
sonable legislators acting reasonably; certainly that is the premise
for purposivism in the later legal process account of interpretation,
as we shall see.28 This may even be a necessary feature of
purposivism; it may be conceptually impossible for j udges to pro
ceed by imagining what unreasonable legislators would do. So to
deny that the j udges can assess the reasonableness or equity of
some particular statutory application is also to deny purposivism;
Bentham cannot have it both ways. Conversely, Blackstone's
second-best argument for interpretive formalism was precisely that
judicial disagreement about what is equitable would make inter
pretation unacceptably subjective and uncertain (because of "dif
ferences of capacity and sentiment"29 across j udges). Bentham fails
to appreciate that the rapier he uses to skewer the common law
judges might be turned against the purposivist statutory interpreta
tion he also embraces.
Why might Bentham have neglected, in his critique of common
law method, the institutional critique of flexible interpretation?
There may be a clue in his most focused treatment of the relation
ship between interpretation and judicial discretion - a short
discussion in his great unpublished work on legislation, Of Laws in
General. There Bentham argues that legislative mistakes - the
enactment of statutes that are overinclusive or underinclusive rela
tive to their purposes due to inadvertence, lack of foresight, or
changed circumstances - require that j udges possess the power to
"mould[] into form" statutes that would otherwise do "mischief." 30
example, so it isn't clear how seriously we are to take it. See also JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 155 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1 987) (urging that "laws should
be literally followed").
26. BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at 159.
27. Id. at 1 15.
28. See the discussion of Hart and Sacks infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
29. 1 B LACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *62.
30. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 239 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) [here
inafter BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL].
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Yet this power in turn created the possibility that informational
deficits or bad motives on the part of judges would pervert the
legislative product and increase legal uncertainty:
How difficult to distinguish what the legislator would have adopted
had he adverted to it, from what he actually did advert to and reject.
How easy to establish the one under pretence of looking for the
other? ... And thus sprang up by degrees another branch of custom
ary law, which striking its roots into the substance of the statute law,
infected it with its own characteristic obscurity, uncertainty, and
confusion.31

This is a powerful indictment of purposivism and imaginative
reconstruction. On the score of institutional sophistication,
Bentham here outdoes his jurisprudential successors of the next
century, including both H.L.A. Hart and the legal process scholars;
we will see that the later accounts fail even to see the problem that
Bentham poses.
Yet for this Bentham himself must take a great deal of blame.
The prescriptions he offered to cure the problems of purposivism
rest on the same sort of idealized or stylized view of institutional
capacities that infects most of Blackstone's treatment, and that
Bentham might have been expected to transcend. Bentham first
suggests that "the necessity of discretionary interpretation" can be
"supersede[d]" by the development of a sufficiently perspicacious
legislative code (doubtless the code developed in Bentham's own
extensive proposals for law reform).32 But this idealizes legislative
capacities, thus reversing the characteristic error of common law
interpretation.33 Bentham himself recognizes, both here and
elsewhere, that institutional limitations on legislatures make the
project of a fully specified code fantastic. So Bentham abashedly
sketches a fallback plan, never fully developed, whereby judges
would "declare openly" the need for judicial "alteration" of a stat
ute in appropriate cases, and certify a proposed emendation to the
legislature; the emendation would have legal force unless "nega
tived" or vetoed by the legislature within a certain time.34 Absent
from the proposal is any explanation why the judges, whose infor
mation and motivations Bentham has so powerfully impeached,
will be able to distinguish alterations from interpretations or be
willing to comply with the plan even where alterations are identifi
able as such.

3 1 . Id. at 240.
32. Id.
33. Hart provides a helpful correction here. See infra notes 39-49 and accompany
ing text.
34. BENTHAM, Or LAWS IN GENERAL, supra note 30, at 241 .
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Taking Blackstone and Bentham together, the striking irony is
that the common law jurist more nearly appreciates and antici
pates the second-best justifications for formalist, rule-bound statu
tory interpretation than does the great critic of the common law.
Bentham's turn into the blind alley of complete codification, under
the influence of an idealized picture of legislative capacities, did
little more than create a target for subsequent critics, such as
H.L.A. Hart, who could justify antiformalist interpretation by
pointing to the limits of legislative foresight while overlooking the
countervailing limits on the capacities of antiformalist interpreters.
B.

The Modern Era: Positivism, Purposivism, and Integrity

We now turn to the defining period of modern j urisprudence.
In this period, academic observers largely attempted to steer a
middle course between formalism and realism.35 They argued that
interpretation was not merely a matter of following established
rules, but also that it was far from simple or direct policy analysis.36
For present purposes, we focus on the critique of formalism and on
the institutional blindness of that critique - not to show that for
malism is right, but to identify the issues on which its acceptance or
rejection might turn. One of the most striking fe atures of the pe
riod is that it was dominated by the work of the "legal process"
school, whose central mission was to focus attention on institu
tional considerations. And indeed, the legal process materials do
talk a great deal about comparative institutional compe.tence,37 and
35. See, e.g., EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGA L REASONING ( 1949).
We do not discuss the realists themselves, though it is noteworthy that they tended to
argue for candid and open-ended judicial policymaking in the face of ambiguous stat
utes, without grappling with the risks posed by judicial discretion. See, e.g. , Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons Abatti
How Statutes A re To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 ( 1 950) (suggesting, after
challenging the canons of construction, that courts should "strive to make sense as a
whole out of our law as a whole," without engaging the obvious institutional problems
raised by any such effort). Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863,
884 (1930), criticizes the conventional sources of interpretation and suggests that the
real question is: "Will the inclusion of this particular determinate in the statutory de
terminable lead to a desirable result?" Radin does not address the difficulties that
courts might face in answering that question. Of course we do not deny the possibility
that the sources of law favored by the formalist - above all, the text - will leave ambi
guities; in such cases, institutional considerations are highly relevant to the decision of
how to proceed. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), represents an institutionally grounded choice to leave the resolution to
the relevant administrative agency. See Section IIl.B below for discussion. A realist
style emphasis on the effects of social position on judicial decisionmaking and the risks
of bias would of course amplify concerns about judicial capacities.
36. See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 35, at 3-8.
37. HART & SACKS, supra note 1 4, at 1 58-72 (surveying the major lawmaking insti
tutions and their relationships).
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do discuss the relevance of agency interpretations of law.38 Even in
those materials, however, the question of interpretation is
answered by asking about how ideal judges would proceed rather
than by asking about how real-world j udges should proceed. But to
say this is to get ahead of the story; let us begin with H.L.A. Hart,
simply because his treatment of legal interpretation can be seen as
canonical.
Hart. In his discussion of mechanical j urisprudence and rule
skepticism, Hart offers a highly influential account of the failures
of formalism - an account that, remarkably, says not a word
about institutional issues.39 A chief contribution of the account is a
clear and convincing explanation of why Bentham was wrong to
hope that a rule-bound legislative code could sensibly resolve all
cases that might arise under it.40 What is absent is a serious treat
ment of how institutions should respond to the inevitability that
unexpected cases will confound the expectations of rulemakers.
Hart's principal submission is that in hard cases, interpretive
problems arise from legislators' "inability to anticipate."41 It is, in
his view, a "feature of the human predicament (and so the legisla
tive one) that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever
we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere
of conduct by means of general standards to be used without fur
ther official direction on particular occasions."42 These handicaps
are "our relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indetermi
nacy of aim."43 Mechanical j urisprudence or formalism, involving
simple application of law to fact (Bentham's utopia), would be
possibly only if "the world in which we live were characterized
only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the
modes in which they combine could be known to us."44 But
"[p]lainly this world is not our world."45
Hart claims that the "vice known to legal theory as formalism
or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated
rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for . . .
choice, once the general rule has been laid down. "46 This is some
times done by freezing "the meaning of the rule so that its general
38. Id. at 1 271-312 (examining administrative interpretation of statutes).
39. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 20-30 ( 1 96 1 ).
40. Id. al 1 25-26.
41. Id. at 125.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44.

Id.

45. Id.
46. Id. al 126.
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terms must have the same meaning in every case where its applica
tion is in question."47 And what is wrong with that freezing? Hart
has a simple answer. He urges that this approach secures
a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly pre
judging what is to be done in a range of future cases, about whose
composition we are ignorant. We shall thus indeed succeed in set
tling in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only be rea
sonably be settled when they arise and are identified.48

And what is wrong with decision in the dark? Hart urges that this
kind of decision forces us "to include in the scope of a rule cases
which we would wish to exclude in order to give effect to reason
able social aims . . . . "49
Hart is entirely right to urge that the absence of legislative
foresight is inevitable and that this can create serious problems for
interpretation. But notice Hart's apparently unselfconscious use of
the word "we" to identify the interpreting authority. Of course
Hart's readers do not constitute a community of "we's" who have
the power to adopt a mutually agreeable approach to interpreta
tion. And once it is seen that a system of interpretation must be es
tablished that some "they" must apply, the assessment of "decision
in the dark" as opposed to decision based on "reasonable social
aims" will appear in a very different light. If we make our assess
ment in institutional terms, we will see that Hart is neglecting two
points. The first involves the risk of judicial blunder under one or
another approach; the second involves the dynamic effects of one
or another approach to interpretation.
Suppose, for example, that j udges will err if they attempt to
discern "reasonable social aims." At least it is conceivable, in light
of human fallibility, that some judges would do better, by the lights
of many or most, if they refused to inquire into reasonable aims.
An important factor here is that it is sometimes complicated to
make that inquiry; an equally important factor is that sometimes
people dispute how to answer it. Take TVA v. Hill ,50 the famous
snail darter case, raising the question whether the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") should be taken to block the completion of
an important dam, because of the late discovery, on the land, of an
ecologically unimportant fish. Does this application of the ESA
violate reasonable social aims? People do not agree about the an
swer to that question.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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In addition, a sensible system of interpretation is based on an
understanding that dynamic effects are highly likely; it sees that
the judges' approach will not be limited in its effects to the imme
diate parties or even to the system of adjudication.51 Hart seems
oblivious to this point. Suppose that courts, deciding the issue in
the light, will introduce a high degree of uncertainty into the law,
making it harder for people to plan their affairs. Suppose too that
if they proceed in the dark, they will create strong incentives for
the legislature, which will promptly correct the problems that
arise.52 In these circumstances, might not formalism be the most
sensible path? What is most remarkable is that Hart appears not to
see the problem at all.
Hart and Sacks. Now consider the influential treatment by
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in their enormously influential legal
process materials.53 In a brilliant "note on the rudiments of statu
tory interpretation," Hart and Sacks urge that the task of interpre
tation requires courts, first and foremost, to "decide what purpose
ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provi
sion of it which may be involved," and to "interpret the words of
the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose
as best it can."54 Hart and Sacks caution that courts should not give
words a meaning that their text will not bear. But they also urge
that courts should require Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to
accomplish certain ends, including "a departure from a generally
prevailing principle or policy of the law."55 These are the building
blocks for � complex system of interpretation, in which judges
treat legislators as "reasonable people proceeding reasonably,"
make "purpose" crucial to interpretation, and push statutory
language, where fa irly possible, in the direction of sense and con
sistency with the rest of the law's fabric.
In the abstract, this approach seems perfectly sensible, and we
will not argue that it is indefensible here. But to evaluate it, we
need to know how well judges are able to execute the suggested
approach, and how other persons and institutions will react to it.
51. As we later suggest, this point strengthens the argument for respecting common
law precedents. See infra Section 1 1 1 .C. See also infra Section 1 1.C, where we suggest
various factors that might militate in favor of a more measured approach to statutory
interpretation.
52. Note here that Congress ultimately authorized completion of the dam involved
in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 1 53 (1 978), see infra note 70, and also significantly amended the
Delaney Clause in response to concerns about excessive rigidity, see Food Quality
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 1 04-1 70, 1 10 Stat. 1 489 ( 1 996).
53. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1 374-80.
54. Id. at 1 374.
55. Id. at 1377. Related issues were raised in the context of American slavery. For
discussion, see ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
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The fact that Hart and Sacks do not explore these issues is ex
tremely revealing, for a primary contribution of the legal process
materials was to put the spotlight on institutional issues, and
indeed to assess much of law in a pragmatic spirit. With respect to
legal interpretation, Hart and Sacks did not keep the institutional
project in mind, perhaps because of the tenacity of the common
law framework with which they began. "Purposes" are their
loadstar; but purposes are hardly transparent. Is the purpose of the
Delaney Clause to eliminate carcinogenic substances from the
food supply? To make Americans safer? To improve the world?
The characterization of purposes involves a large element of dis
cretion, and here it is necessary to know how the discretion will be
exercised. Sometimes the characterization of purposes will have a
significant political or even ideological component. Hart and Sacks
pay no attention to that issue; they seem to think that it is irrele
vant.
General lessons cannot be drawn from the practice of interpre
tation under fascism, but for our purposes, some illumination can
be found from the disparate practices of Italian and German
courts. The Italian judiciary, faced with a totalitarian regime, en
gaged in a strategy of resistance based on the idea of "plain
meaning."56 They prohibited the government from acting in a way
that did violence to the apparent meaning of statutory texts.57 This
was a self-conscious method for limiting fascist government, by re
.
quiring genuine statutory authorization for its goals. By contrast,
German j udges rejected formalism and construed statutes �ospita
bly and in accordance with their "purposes," as defined by refer
ence to the public values of the Nazi regime.58 They thought that
courts could carry out their interpretive task "only if they· do not
remain glued to the letter of the law, but rather penetrate its inner
core in their interpretations and do their part to see that the aims
of the lawmaker are realized."59 Thus, for example, the German
Supreme Court concluded that a law forbidding "sexual
intercourse" between Germans and Jews "is . . . not limited to
coition. . . . A broad interpretation is . . . appropriate in view of the
fact that the provisions of the law are meant to protect not only
German blood but also German honor."60 A lower court went so
far as to conclude that kissing could take "the place of normal
.U.

56. See the account in Guido Calabresi, Essay: Two Functions of Formalism. 67
CHI. L. REV. 479 (2000).
57. Id.

58. See lNGO MULLER, HITLER'S J USTICE; THE COURTS OF THE THI RD REICH
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1 991).
59. Id. at 1 01 .
60. Id. at 100-01 (citation omitted).
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sexual intercourse" and therefore violate the statute in such a way
as to justify a two-year jail sentence.6t
Of course we do not suggest that purposive interpretation is an
ally of fascism, or that it is always illegitimate or unacceptable. Our
only claim is that the evaluation of purposive interpretation must
depend, in large part, on an assessment of the relevant institutions
and of the effects of that approach over time. It is ludicrous to sug
gest that purposive interpretation is best in the abstract, for the
simple reason that no approach to interpretation is best in the ab
stract. Here, as elsewhere, Hart and Sacks's elaborate talk about
institutional competence is undercut by their stylized, nonempiri
cal treatment of actual institutions and their capacities.
Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin is often taken to be H.L.A. Hart's
antagonist, urging an approach that Dworkin calls "integrity,"
meant to be alternative to Hart's form of positivism.62 But on the
issue that concerns us, Dworkin shares Hart's blindness. On
Dworkin's account, judges who seek "integrity" attempt to put
existing legal materials in "the best light possible."63 They owe a
duty of fidelity to those materials, but they are also authorized to
attempt to understand the materials by reference to what they see
as the most appealing principle that organizes them. "Law as in
tegrity asks judges to assume, as far as this is possible, that the law
is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fair
ness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these
in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's
situation is fair and just according to the same standards."64 In ar
guing for this understanding of adjudication, Dworkin says too lit
tle about the virtues and the imperfections of judges and the sys
temic effects of one or another approach to interpretation.
Dworkin devotes a great deal of space to Riggs v. Palmer,65 the
famous case posing the question whether judges should adopt a
literal interpretation of the law of wills if the consequence would
be to allow a murderer to inherit from his victim.66 And Dworkin is
not wrong to argue that Riggs "was a dispute about what the law
was, about what the real statute the legislators enacted really
said."67 But it is inadequate to cast the issue in those terms. The

6 1 . Id. at 102.
62. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 2.
63.

hi.

at 243.

64. lei.

65. 22 N.E. 1 88 ( 1889).
66. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 15-20.
67. Id. at 20. We say that this is not wrong, but it seems to us unhelpful. Neither
view in Riggs could be said to be lawless. But to ask what the law "really said" obscures
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dispute was about the appropriate approach to a statute whose lit
eral text produces absurdity. If courts ask about the meaning of
"the real statute the legislators enacted," they will not be asking
some of the crucial questions.
Dworkin does not say how he would decide Riggs, but he does
offer a conclusion about the appropriate resolution of TVA v. Hill.
Dworkin supposes that his idealized judge, Hercules, "shares the
substantive opinion that seemed dominant on the [Supreme]
Court, that the wiser course would be to sacrifice the fish to the
dam."68 If so, Dworkin urges, it is "not difficult" to see how
Hercules will vote, because he "thinks reading the statute to save
the dam would make it better from the point of view of sound
policy."69 Given that j udgment, Hercules will vote to allow the dam
to be completed.
But to know how to vote in TVA v. Hill, is it really enough to
consult "sound policy"? Here Dworkin sounds very much like
Hart, urging that statutory language should not be taken to conflict
with reasonable social purposes. Other things being equal, the
claim is surely correct. But it is important to ask whether Congress
would overturn a literal interpretation of the ESA, if the conse
quence was indeed to violate sound policy. Subsequent events
showed that Congress was entirely willing to do that.70 And it is
also important to ask about the systemic effects of a ruling that
would allow the dam to be completed. If that were the ruling, what
would the ESA actually mean? Would subsequent cases become
hard too? If this question is in turn difficult to answer, then the
consequences of the ruling, in itself sensible, might in their way
conflict with "sound policy" as well.71 And in cases of this sort, do
we have good reason to trust judges' views about sound policy? If
the question is highly politicized, if people disagree along partisan
the key issue, which is how j udges should interpret it, given the institutional variables
discussed in the text.
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id.
70. Congress promptly established an administrative mechanism for granting ex
emptions from the Endangered Species Act, see Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 , 375260 (1978), and Congress itself specifically exempted the dam at issue in TVA v. /-/ill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978). See Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449 (1979).
71. Of course it will not always be easy to assess, in advance, these consequences.
But the key question is whether the statute, after the departure from formalism, leaves
subsequent judges with many open issues, or whether it instead becomes a rule with a
limited, well-understood exception. If the Court ruled. in TVA v. /-lilt, 437 U.S. 153
(1 978), that the protection of endangered species does not prohibit government actions
that are "near completion," subsequent judges would have a great deal to grapple with,
because the idea of being "near completion" is hardly self-defining. The point we are
stressing here is that the argument for departing from formalism is weakest when sub
sequent courts are at sea, and strongest when the exception is clear and crisp.
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lines, or if a high degree of technical expertise is required,72 judicial
judgments might well be unreliable. These points suggest that it is
hardly enough to ask, as Dworkin urges, which interpretation of
the ESA would best complete the story that Congress has begun.
If institutional considerations are taken into account, we might
conclude that judges should ask themselves a very different set of
questions.
Where statutes are entirely ambiguous, it is impossible to de
cide cases simply by reference to their words. But in TVA v. Hill,
the words were far more easily taken to ban the completion of the
dam; and judicial unreliability, on conflicts between environmental
and economic goals, might well be taken to argue in favor of for
malism.73 What is striking about Dworkin's analysis is that it is
undertaken without any thought at all about judicial capacities and
about the effects, over time, of one or another approach to inter
pretation. Like Hart, Dworkin proceeds as if the question is how
an idealized judge deals with interpretive problems - not how a
real-world judge, operating as part of a deci.sionmaking committee
staffed by multiple actors, should proceed in the face of uncer
tainty.
C.

Contemporary Theory: Dynamism, Textualism, and
Pragmatism

Contemporary interpretive theory is increasingly sophisticated
along many margins. Philosophy (including pragmatist antifounda
tionalism), linguistics, and economics have all contributed to
ever more refined normative accounts of interpretation. Yet on
the critical dimension of institutional awareness, many of the most
prominent contemporary theorists do no better than their prede
cessors, or so we will claim. Institutional blindness remains a per
vasive condition in the current scene.
Eskridge. William Eskridge has a claim to being the most
prominent interpretive theorist of the modern era; his identifica
tion and critique of the "new textualism,"74 and his advocacy of
72. Of course amicus briefs might provide some help in this regard, though their
reliability is weakened by the fact that they often come from well-organized groups with
a stake in the outcome.
73. Consider in this re!!,ard the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century struggle
between courts and the regulatory slate, in which judges. trying to harmonize regulatory.
statutes with the common law, tended to require Congress to speak unambiguously if it
sought to depart from judicial understandings, and abandoned plain or ordinary mean
ing in order lo minimize conflicts with those understandings. The result was to limit the
reach of statutes designed to protect workers and consumers. See, e.g. , FTC v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298. 305-06 ( 1 924): Shaw v. R.R. Co. 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1 880).
.

74. See William N. Eskridge. Jr., The New Textualism. 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
( 1 990).
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"dynamic interpretation,"75 redefined the field in the late 1980s.
Yet a neglect of institutional factors undercuts Eskridge's conclu
sions j ust as it did his predecessors'.76 Dynamic statutory interpre
tation, it turns out, embodies the nirvana fallacy - the juxtaposi
tion of an idealized picture of judicial capacities with a grudging
picture of the capacities of other actors in the interpretive system.
Eskridge's principal target is the formalist approach that em
phasizes the original meaning of statutory text; his principal criti
cism is that this approach stumbles on the problem of statutory
obsolescence - statutes that have fallen out of step with the public
values prevailing in the surrounding context of the legal system.
Dynamic interpretation is the answer to the problem of obsoles
cence. Rather than adhering either to ordinary meaning at the
time of enactment, or even to legislative intent conceived in strictly
originalist terms, courts should "update" statutes by intelligent
adaptation of original purposes to new social circumstances, and
by taking account of changes in the overall fabric of public law.77
Yet Eskridge is sensitive to the radicalism of this recommendation,
which he moderates and improves by adding a side constraint:
j udges should treat contemporary public values as something like
an interpretive principle or canon, defeasible by clear contrary in
structions from legislatures.78
At first glance this position is attractive, even compelling; how
could "wooden" or "mechanical" enforcement of obsolete statutes
possibly be the best course of action for j udges to take? Eskridge's
claims certainly have some descriptive power, and on certain
assumptions, they might be plausible on institutional grounds as
well. Yet Eskridge fails to discuss those assumptions or those
grounds. He does not sufficiei;itly explore how the case for dy
namic interpretation fares once we recognize the possibility that
j udges will make serious mistakes in updating, or that the ex ante
effects of dynamism on legislative behavior might prove perni
cious.79 We may agree with Eskridge that judicial updating is a
good thing, all else equal, but the proviso is crucial. The possibility
of j udicial mistakes, or of deleterious systemic effects, makes
75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory /111erpreU/tion. 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory /111erpretatio11].
76. Candor requires an acknowledgement that one of the present authors showed a
similar blindness in his youth (adolescence? infancy?). See Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
77. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 75. at 1 484.
78.

/cl.

at 1542-44.

79. Though Eskridge addresses these issues in passing, see id. at 1 533-38. he con
cludes that, "[t]he slowness and deliberateness of judicial lawmaking ensures that it will
never be a threat to legislated lawmaking as the main source of policy preference and
priorities in the United States." Id. at 1537.
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Eskridge's defe nse of dynamism radically incomplete. Dynamic in
terpretation might or might not prove justified, given adequate
information on these variables; here as elsewhere we take no posi
tion on that ultimate question. What is clear is that Eskridge has
failed to give adequate attention to some of the critical questions.
Start with the question of judicial error. The linchpin of dyna
mism is the claim that "when societal conditions change in ways
not anticipated by Congress and, especially, when the legal and
constitutional context of the statute decisively shifts as well, this
current perspective should, and will, affect the statute's interpreta
tion."80 This is essentially a recommendation to minimize the false
negative or Type II error: the possibility that nondynamic ap
proaches will erroneously fail to update obsolete statutes. But
Eskridge says very little about the converse possibility, the false
positive or Type I error: the risk that the judges' relative social in
sulation, and the resulting informational deficits, might cause them
to err in the other direction, updating statutes that aren't obsolete
because the j udges fail to comprehend the statute's current social
utility. If j udicial updating produces erroneous rewriting of statutes
whose sensible and fully up-to-date j ustifications the judges have
simply failed to understand, then dynamism may cause more insti
tutional failure than .would a rule denying judges the authority to
update. In any case, updating may cause harm if the new values,
not yet able to receive clear democratic support, are questionable
on normative grounds. (Is it entirely irrelevant to mention that
Nazi judges were enthusiastic updaters?)
Eskridge also overlooks the possibility that the systemic effects
of nondynamic interpretive approaches would prove better, on
Eskridge's own criteria, than would the systemic effects of dyna
mism. Eskridge supports his case for dynamism by drawing upon
process theory and public choice, arguing that "the legislature
acting alone will be subject to . . . biases,"81 and that "given the
biases of the political process, the fact that j udges are not .elected
may enable them to be better 'representatives' of the people than
their elected legislators are (in some instances)."82 It may be true
that interest-group pressure and institutional failures will cause
Congress to update statutes with insufficient frequency, relative to
some optimal rate of policy change. But that failure might itself be
an endogenous consequence of the interpretive theory the judges
use. Textualists indeed argue that their methods will spur legisla-

80. Id. at 1 494.
81. Id. at 1530.
82. hi.

February 2003]

Interpretation and Institutions

tores to update at an optimal rate,83 and there is certainly some
evidence of updating in response to textualism.84 If so, then textu
alism would itself just be the dynamic approach to interpretation
that Eskridge advocates. On certain empirical premises about in
stitutional capacities, Eskridge ought to support the very textual
ism that he spends so much time excoriating.
In later work, Eskridge episodically shows an awareness of
these considerations, acknowledging, in the limited context of the
legislative-history debate, that the desirability of judicial resort to
legislative history turns importantly on a cost-benefit calculus that
examines j udicial performance, litigation costs, and legal certainty
in competing legislative-history regimes.85 Yet he also seems to
think this sort of analysis theoretically disreputable or empirically
intractable or both. In even more recent work, Eskridge reverses
his ground, arguing both that empiricism is conceptually meaning
less without normative premises (a question we address below)
and that the relevant empirical and institutional variables are
costly to measure - certainly true, but hardly an argument for
nonempirical interpretive theory.86 The sum of it is that, as with
some of the other theorists we will consider, Eskridge occasionally
notes the critical institutional considerations in passing but fails to
incorporate them into his normative account of interpretation in
any systematic way.
It is worth emphasizing that none of these considerations nec
essarily refutes Eskridge's dynamic conclusions. If judges update
successfully more often than not, and if textualist interpretation
causes legislatures to spend most of their time correcting mistaken
(because wooden or mechanical) judicial interpretations, then tex
tualism would prove inferior to dynamic interpretation; Eskridge's
methods would push the courts closer to the optimal · rate of
updating. But there is no valid path to that conclusion from
Eskridge's institutionally insensitive premises.
Manning. Among contemporary writers, Eskridge's chief for
malist adversary is John Manning, whose work details an impor
tant textualist account of interpretation rooted in constitutional
law, in contrast to Eskridge's nontextualist dynamism. For our
purposes, however, the common ground between Eskridge and
Manning is more important than their differences. Strikingly,
83. See Adrian Venneule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 103 (2000).
84. The Delaney Clause was substantially amended by the Food Quality Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
85. See William N. Eskridge,
REV. 1509, 1541 (1998).

Jr.,

Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.

86. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U . CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999).
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despite spirited debates between them, Eskridge and Manning
largely share the crucial and mistaken premise that the important
questions about interpretive theory are first-best questions, rather
than second-best questions about institutional performance and
systemic effects.
Manning's work shows that insufficient attention to institu
tional capacities is an equal opportunity hazard, one that afflicts
nonformalists and formalists alike. Manning's contribution is to
have provided the most rigorous attempt to j ustify formalist modes
of interpretation by reference to formal sources of law, principally
the Constitution. In our view, however, the project is an impossible
one; it is doomed to failure despite Manning's skill at deductive
reasoning from constitutional premises. Interpretive formalism at
the operational level - formalism in the jurisprudentially modest
sense of rule-bound interpretation that sticks close to the surface
of statutory texts, where it is possible to do so - cannot itself be
justified by conceptual deduction from constitutional premises.
Supplemental institutional and empirical premises are needed,
premises about the comparative capacities of institutional actors
and about formalism's ex ante effects.
Consider Manning's influential critique of judicial resort to
legislative history.87 The argument suggests that the Constitution,
particularly Article l's procedure of statutory enactment, should
be read to embody an implicit norm against legislative self
delegation. That constitutional norm forbids courts to afford
"authoritative" weight to legislative history in statutory interpreta
tion, but allows consultation of legislative history as a persuasive
or confirmatory source.88 B ut this deduction, even if valid, leaves
open the most important questions about legislative history at the
operative level, the level of the interpretive doctrines that judges
should use. Few people think that the legislative history is
"authoritative" in the sense that it trumps unambiguous text; the
usual argument is that the history is relevant to ascertaining
meaning. That courts may not afford legislative history authorita
tive weight does not tell us whether courts should use legislative
history at all. That question, the crucial one, cannot be resolved
through Manning's methods; its resolution depends on institu
tional issues. Manning's position forbids the judges to afford leg
islative history authoritative weight, but nothing in the analysis
suggests that the Constitution either requires or forbids the judges
to consult legislative history for its persuasive value. The j udges

87. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondefegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 695 (1997).
88. Id. at 728.
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presumably retain constitutional discretion to use it, or to eschew
its use, on other grounds. Whether they should do so is a function
of the consequences of the various alternative rules about legisla
tive history that the j udges might adopt; those consequences will
turn on institutional facts about judges' capacities as interpreters
of legislative history and the ex ante effects on legislative drafting.
The general point here is that the formal constitutional
premises that Manning marshals, such as the textual separation of
powers and its original understanding, mandate neither formalist
interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive methods.89 The
Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal about the
contested issues of statutory interpretation; what it does say is of
ten so minimal and so abstract as to leave open all the reasonably
disputed questions of interpretive choice. Article I of the
Constitution, for example, specifies the conditions for the enact
ment of valid statutes,90 and the Supremacy Clause mandates that
constitutionally valid statutes are supreme law,91 so all major inter
pretive approaches agree that judges should respect the statutory
text. But no provision sets out explicit instructions to judges about
what other sources or considerations are admissible and relevant
to help interpret the text. Nor do abstractions like the separation
of powers supply much in the way of concrete guidance. Textually,
provisions like the vesting clauses of Articles I and III separate
legislative from j udicial power, but textualists, intentionalists, pur
posivists, and others can all validly claim that their preferred
method respects this weak constraint.92 At the level of express
commands, the Constitution simply does not choose sides in the
competition between first-best interpretive approaches that char
acterizes modern legal theory.
Furthermore, any supplemental instructions that can be elicited
from the text, or infused into it through structural and historical
89. But see John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 686 (1999) (rejecting the "contention that the Constitution has
little to say about the choice between formalist and antiformalist methodologies").
Manning's view here is appropriately nuanced; he disavows any suggestion that "infer
ences from constitutional structure will always provide clear answers to questions of
interpretive design," and notes that "[w]hen they do not, the judiciary may have room
to make choices among particular interpretive strategies." ld. at 692-93.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I , § 7 (detailing procedures of bicameral approval and pre
sentment to the President, and requiring that a "bill" must undergo those procedures to
become a "law").
91. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that "Laws of the United States" made
"in pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
92. Compare Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 10-15 {basing textualism on the
separation of legislative and judicial power), with T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 23 (1988) (noting that intentionalism is
grounded in respect for legislative supremacy).

909

910

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:885

analysis, prove compatible with most plausible positions on the
contested problems of statutory interpretation. Consider the
recent debate between Manning and Eskridge over the original
understanding of the Article III "judicial Power."93 Manning says
that the grant of judicial power, understood both historically
and in light of structural inferences from other provisions, bars
"equitable" interpretation of the Blackstonian sort and thus com
mands federal courts to follow a "faithful agent" account of inter
pretation.94 Eskridge says that the Blackstonian appeal to statutes'
equity and spirit has a better historical pedigree than faithful-agent
approaches, and that courts interpreting equitably are helpful
partners in the process of lawmaking - and thus better agents,
even on Manning's own terms, than are courts enslaved to a hier
archical vision of legislative supremacy.95 This is a fight that can
end only in stalemate. As for the history, there are respectable bits
of originalist evidence on both sides, and no agreed upon origi
nalist criterion or metaprocedure exists for adjudicating between
them. As for the structural inferences, constitutional premises
about equity, agency and legislative supremacy are pitched at
too high a level of generality to cut between competing views
about, say, the interpretive value of committee reports or the
absurd-results canon.
The important point here is that the Manning/Eskridge debate
rests on an assumption, common to both parties, that the contest
of interpretive theories must take place on constitutional terrain.
But the best reading of the Constitution is that interpretive for
malism and interpretive antiformalism are constitutionally op
tional for j udges. On this view, Manning's project fails, not by vir
tue of any failure in execution, but by virtue of its intrinsic
limitations: the tools of constitutional formalism are too weak to
produce closure, by themselves, on the contested questions of in
terpretive doctrine. Those questions require empirical and institu
tional analysis in addition to first-best theorizing from constitu
tional premises.
Richard Posner. We conclude our catalogue with Judge
Richard Posner, the leading advocate of the view that conse
quences should matter to a theory of legal interpretation. In his
early writing on statutory interpretation, Posner endorsed an
"imaginative-reconstruction" approach, asking j udges to recon
struct the views of the enacting legislature and to do what it would
93. Compare Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 10-15,. and John F. Manning,
Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1648 (2001), with Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 10.
94. Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 57-58, 126-27.
95. Eskridge, All A bout Words, supra note 10, at 997, 1087.
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have done, had it been presented with the case at hand.96 This ap
proach, borrowed in part from Learned Hand,97 is an expanded
version of Blackstone's idea that j udges should make exceptions to
overbroad statutes in "those circumstances, which (had they been
foreseen), the legislator himself would have excepted."98 Like
Blackstone's approach, imaginative reconstruction is blind to insti
tutional considerations of the sort that we have been emphasizing
throughout. That the legislature, if informed of the application at
hand, would have adopted a particular statutory amendment does
not mean that it would want the j udges to do so on their own ini
tiative. And if j udges frequently err in their counterfactual suppo
sitions about what the legislature would have done, then imagina
tive reconstruction may, even on its own terms, push the juµges
even farther away from the legislature's intentions than unimagi
native textualism would have.
More recently, Posner has endorsed a pragmatic account of
adjudication generally, one that subsumes a pragmatic account of
statutory interpretation.99 The pragmatic account should be fertile
soil for the sort of institutional analysis needed in interpretive
theory. Pragmatism, as Posner uses the term, is a form of conse
quentialism, hospitable territory for the approach urged here. Our
theme is precisely that interpretive rules can't sensibly be chosen
without consideration of institutional consequences. And indeed
Posner does recognize the possibility that the pragmatic judge
might, on certain empirical premises about the institutional capaci
ties of j udges and legislatures, decide that interpretive formalism
at the operational level would itself be the pragmatically best
course of action.100
Yet this possibility remains, for Posner, an abstract and unap
pealing one. As soon as possible he falls back upon a distinction
between consequences for the "case at hand" and the "systemic"
consequences of decisions. On this view, the pragmatist maximand
is to do what is best in the case at hand, subject to a side
constraint: that case-specific adjudication not produce unaccept-

96. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of Stallltes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) [hereinafter
Posner, Legal Formalism].
97. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley .Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1 914)
(Hand, J.).
98. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *61.
99. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235-53
(Morris Dickstein ed., 1 998) (hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication].
100. Id. at 247.
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able systemic costs in legal uncertainty and other undesirable con
sequences:
The pragmatist thinks that what the judge is doing in deciding the
nonroutine case is trying to come up wiih the most reasonable result
in the circumstances, with due regard for such systemic constraints
on the freewheeling employment of 'reason' as the need to maintain
continuity with previous decisions and respect the limitations that
the language and discernible purposes of constitutional and statutory
texts impose on the interpreter.101

The point of all this is to preserve some domain of policymaking
discretion for judges, some field in which pragmatic judges can run
free, bringing their all-things-considered consequentialist judg
ments to bear on the parties before them. Posner is quite candid
about this:
[A]t their best American appellate courts are councils of wise elders
and it is not completely insane to entrust them with responsibility for
deciding cases in a way that will produce the best results in the cir
cumstances rather than just deciding cases in accordance with rules
created by other organs of government or in accordance with their
own previous decisions, although that is what they will be doing most
of the time.102

It should be apparent that this distinction between case-specific
consequences and systemic consequences, between the pragmatist
maximand and the pragmatic side constraint, is illusory. The deci
sion to license judges, in some domain, to interpret statutes. so as
to maximize beneficial consequences in the case at hand is itself a
system-level choice of a particular kind, a choice that will have
system-level effects on the legislatures, agencies,' and litigants who
must anticipate judges' efforts to sort ·cases from one domain to
the other. Values must be attached to the relevant institutional
variables; but the legal uncertainty, including decision and litiga
tion costs, that the distinction creates might overwhelm the social
benefits attainable in the class of cases that Posner would leave to
freewheeling judicial discretion. So the questions are systemic all
the way down, and Posner's distinction collapses on itself.
If the distinction is illusory, it nonetheless has harmful effects.
The very making of the distinction has real and unfortunate con
sequences for Posner's account of adjudication generally and in
terpretation in particular. The insistence, amounting to a faith, that
there just has to be some domain of ep.tirely carefree discretion left

I O I . Richard A. Posner, J1ulges ' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. ·CHI.
L. REV. 1 42 1 , 1 432-33 ( 1 995).
1 02. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 99. at 244.
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to the wise elders of the benchio3 causes Posner to take a one-sided
view of the empirical and institutional variaJ?les that a pragmatist
would consider, if genuinely open minded about the possibility
that interpretive formalism is pragmatically best for j udges.
An example is Posner's claim: that American j udges have no
choice but to assume the burdens of rulemaking and policymaking,
because American legislatures (in contrast to Parliament and
Continental legislatures) do not exercise sufficient oversight of the
statutory system, do not correct gaps and resolve ambiguities at a
sufficient rate, and thus leave t.he judges with no option but to
amend statutes and fill statutory gaps through interpretation.u14
The institutional analysis here is radically incomplete and perhaps
mistaken. Posner offers no systematic analysis of the behavior of
American legislatures; he does not show that the legislatiye failure
is as pervasive as he suggests. But suppose that he is right. Even so,
it might well be that the supposed irr�sponsibility of American
legislatures is at least in part the result, not (as Posner assumes)
the cause, of the relatively independent, policy-oriented approach
to interpretation taken by American courts. Perhaps American
legislatures opt for ambiguity and passivity, to the extent that they
do, partly because the correctivist stance of American .courts
ensures that underspecified or ill-considered legislation will in ef
fect be supplemented or amended by judicial decisions. To know
which of these stori�s is true, we would have to know the effects
on legislatures of judicial formalism (or antiformalism); as a result
we cannot rule out formalism as a strategy for American courts.
Posner's claim that Amer:ican j udges cannot be for.malist turns out
to res� not on �vidence, but on intuition and an ungrounded, and
highly contestable, causal theory about the dynamic interaction of
legislatures and courts.
.
Our point is not that, when all of the relevant variables are
considered, the pragmatic judge should be an interpretive formal
ist. Our point is that Posner's attempt to treat systemic conse
quences as merely a side-constraint on interpretation, despite its
appearance of institutional sensitivity and hard-headedness, is just
one more unsuccessful attempt to wall off institutional considera
tions from interpretive theory. If this most consequentialist of
theorists fa lls by the wayside, the problem of institutional insensi
tivity is serious indeed.
103. Our point here is not, of course, that all discretion can be squeezed out of in
terpretation or adjudication, even in cases of real statutory ambiguity. Our point is that
judicial discretion always has system-lev.el effects that judges should consider: there just
is no domain of discretionary decisionmaking whose effects are confined entirely to the
case at hand.
·

·

I 04.

Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, .mprll: note 99, at 250-51 .

·
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FIRST-BEST, S ECOND-B EST, AND RELEVANT QUESTIONS

Thus far we have criticized a wide range of theorists for their
failure to engage institutional issues. But there is an obvious objec
tion to our emphasis on those issues. The objection takes this form:
Is it useful, or even possible, to evaluate institutional variables
without agreeing on a first-best theory? Without such a theory, we
will be unable to know what counts as interpretive error. For some
textualists, adherence to the text is simply the definition of a cor
rect judgment; there is no independent measure of whether a judge
has blundered. It is easy to imagine an advocate of purposive in
terpretation, or of integrity,ios offering the same claim. Perhaps a
j udge proceeds correctly if and only if she puts the existing legal
materials in the best constructive light. If this is so, what's the
point of an institutional turn? Isn't it rudderless, or useful only as
an adjunct to the first-best account?
A.

A Minimal Response

Our minimal response to these questions is that without institu
tional analysis, first-best accounts cannot yield any sensible conclu
sions about interpretive rules. It is impossible to derive interpre
tive rules directly from first-best principles, without answering
second-best questions about institutional performance. Consider
an analogy. In economics, the idea of second-best demonstrates
that if perfect efficiency cannot be obtained, efficiency is not nec
essarily maximized by approximating the first-best efficiency con
ditions as closely as possible; the second-best outcome might, in
principle, be obtained by departing from the first-best conditions
in other respects as wen.106 So too, if an imperfect j udge knows he
will fall short of the standard of perfection defined by the reigning
first-best account of interpretation, it is by no means clear that he
should attempt to approximate or approach that standard as
closely as possible.
Suppose, for example, that we believe that the meaning of a
statute should in principle be established by ascertaining the sub
jective intentions of those who enacted it. It may nonetheless turn
out that fallible j udges ought not, simplemindedly, collect and ex
amine as much evidence of subjective intentions as they can find.
If the text supplies reliable evidence of intention, perhaps the best
evidence, and if j udges will mishandle other types of evidence,
such as legislative history, perhaps restricting j udges solely to the
1 05. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 176-78.
106. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).

February 2003]

Interpretation and Institutions

915

text will increase the likelihood that the judges will accurately
ascertain the legislators' intentions.107 Or suppose we believe that
an ideal interpreter would not allow statutory texts to produce ab
surd results, results not possibly intended by a rational legislator.
From this it does not fol low that the interpretive rules should li
cense real j udges to prevent unintended absurdity. If j udges will
often see absurdity when it isn't really present, simply because
they misunderstand the substantive policies in play, then allowing
them to attempt to correct absurdity might do more harm than
good; perhaps they should not make that inquiry at all.
These examples illustrate that, at the very least, institutional
analysis is necessary, even if not sufficient, to an adequate evalua
tion of interpretive methods. It is of course true, in these examples,
that some first-best account is needed in order to define j udicial
error. Our minimal point is that the first-best account, taken by
itself, is necessarily incomplete. It is impossible to derive interpre
tive rules directly from the first-best account, because institutional
considerations always intervene. An intentionalist account of stat
utes' authority, by itself, tells us nothing about whether real j udges
should consult or not consult legislative history; a theoretical
injunction to avoid absurd outcomes, by itself, tell us nothing
about whether real j udges should be licensed to use an absurd
results doctrine. In any of these settings, certain findings about in
stitutional capacities might cause the proponent of the first-best
account either to adopt or reject the interpretive doctrine in ques
tion. Theory without institutional analysis spins its wheels, unable
to gain traction on the question of what interpretive rules real
world j udges should use.
B.

Bypassing First-Best Disagreements? Incompletely Theorized
Agreements on Interpretive Practices

But we would go further. A second-best assessment of institu
tional issues might, in some cases, be not only necessary but indeed
sufficient to resolve conflicts over interpretive theories, simply
because the assessment might lead people with different views on
the theoretical issues to agree on the appropriate practices. For
example, intentionalists disagree sharply with textualists, at least
about the right foundation for interpretation. But they agree on a
great deal, and most of the time their disagreements are quite ir
relevant to their resolution of cases. Both agree that the statutory
text is the starting point for interpretation, and both accept the
107. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1 833, 1 862-77
(1998).
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view that ·courts should not lightly depart from the text, which
most intentionalists see as strong evidence of intentions. On the
current Court, textualists are often able to join opinions written by
intentionalists, and vice versa.w8 And given certain empirical and
institutional assumptions, both the intentionalist and the textualist
might even be able to agree upon a rule excluding legislative his
tory. The intentionalist would agree because, on particular empiri
cal premises, the rule would minimize both erroneous determina
tions of legislative intent and the costs of litigation. The textualist
would agree because, on the same premises, the rule would mini
mize erroneous determinations of ordinary textual meaning and
litigation costs. This · consensus would be in the nature of an
incompletely theorized agreement:1()<J interpreters holding different
theories of authority might, in this way, be enabled to converge on
particular doctrines.
There are many possible examples. In a legal system in which
legislators generally corrected absurd outcomes, and in which judi
cial use of the absurd-results canon was abused to fit with judicial
policy preferences� most people would be skeptical of that. canon.
But if absurd outcomes are uncorrected in some domain, and if
courts are careful to apply the canon only in clear cases, what tex
tualist should object?1 10 Indeed, institutional analysis might even
enable interpreters to choose particular doctrines before, or in
place of, choosing a theory of authority. If, on certain empirical
findings, it turned out that legislative history should be excluded
on any theory of the proper aims of interpretation, then as far as
that doctrinal question goes there would be no need to choose a
fundamental theory. .
So it is uncontroversial that talk of judicial mistakes, and insti
tutional analysis generally, presupposes some underlying, first-best
account of interpretation. But the point doesn't cut very deeply,
nor does it contravene any of our claims. What modern interpre
tive theory has largely overlooked is that institutional analysis is a
necessary condition for choosing interpretive domains, even if it is
not a sufficient condition. And in some dornaiils, it may indeed be
a sufficient condition. It is simply a logical blunder to suppose that
interpreters must agree upon some particular theory of authority
·

1 08. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 ( 1 990); Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 ( 1 989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 09. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 1 08 HARV. L. REV.
1 733 (1 995).
1 1 0. It is noteworthy in this regard that Justice Scalia, the leading textualist on the
Court, accepts the idea that absurd outcomes, not reasonably taken as part of
Congress's instructions, should not be allowed even if they seem to fo llow from statu
tory text. See Green, 490 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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in order to agree upon interpretive doctrines. Where an overlap
ping consensus or incompletely theorized agreement is possible,
interpreters may choose rules while bracketing, and remaining
agnostic about, first-best accounts. Of course the scope or size of
the domain in which such agreement is possible remains uncertain.
But that is j ust one more empirical question for institutional analy
sis to answer.
C.

Relevant Questions

Let us conclude this section. by isolating the ingredients of that
analysis, by focussing on the issues, mostly empirical, that must be
explored by those evaluating formalism in various legal' systems
and various domains of law.
• The first question, suggested above, is whether and
when formalist decisions that p roduce clear mistakes
will be corrected by the legislature and whether
making the corrections will have low or high costs.

·

Undoubtedly this question will have different an
swers in different circumstances. We know far too
little to know how to answer it in the United States.
Is the New York legislature, for example, different
on this count from the legislatures of California and
Missouri? It would be highly desirable to know
much more about the interpretive practices of
courts in different states, and to make some evalua
tion of the different solutions. We might be able, for
example, to find state courts that are . especially
unwilling to make exceptions in cases of evident
absurdity - and we might be able to see whether
courts of this kind have produced outcomes that
have remained legislatively uncorrected. We might
also ask whether legislatures are more or less likely
to oversee anc1 fix judicial decision:s that attempt to
follow statutory text.
A similar inquiry might proceed by comparing
judicial and legislative behavior in different domains
of substantive law. Perhaps Congress is unlikely
to police judicial decisions interpreting the Adminis
trative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Sherman
Act; perhaps Congress is entirely willing to oversee
judicial decisions in the are!!S of tax and bankruptcy.
If so, different j udicial approaches might be sensible
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in the different areas.1 1 1 Where Congress is inatten
tive and appears to rely on courts for long periods of
time, an irreverent judicial approach to statutory
text might be defe nsible. Where Congress will cor
rect judicial errors fairly costlessly, formalism is
easier to justify. People with different first-best
theories might well accept these suggestions. Does
American practice, in various domains, suggest that
courts are less formal where Congress is less atten
tive? It would be highly desirable to know. Here
there is a large set of empirical projects.
The second question is whether a nonformalist judi
ciary will greatly increase the costs of decision for
courts, litigants, and those seeking legal advice. A

•

large issue here involves planning; if nonformal
approaches make planning difficult or impossible,
there is a real problem.112 Some areas have a greater
demand for planning than others, and hence it
might be predicted that courts will perceive them
selves as most constrained when planning is neces
sary. We might expect that the basic rules governing
disposition of estates will require a good deal of
clarity, and that in view of considerations of fair
notice, many courts will be reluctant to interpret
criminal statutes flexibly to cover c;:riminal defen
dants.1 13 Is this true? Are generalizations possible
about the circumstances in which nonformalism is
especially unsettling?
The third question is whether a formalist or
nonformalist judiciary, in one or another domain,
will produce mistakes and injustices. Of course peo

ple might dispute the content of these categories.
One person's error might be another's fidelity to
Jaw. But the extent of social disagreement should

111 . Of course, no simple algorithm can say whether Congress is attentive; in some
contexts, reasonable people might disagree about that question. But it is clear that in
some contexts, Congress rarely addresses judicial practices, whereas in others, such
practices are an object of careful attention. The interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Act falls in the first category; the interpretation of the Internal Revenue
Code falls in the second.
112. For a nuanced treatment of the effects of formalism on planning costs in tax
law, suggesting that formalism might increase planning costs by encouraging strategic
behavior, see David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860
(1999).
113. Note that the rule of lenity, calling for courts to interpret statutes favorably to
criminal defendants, can be understood as an outgrowth of the fair notice concern.
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not be overstated here. It is easy to imagine cases in
which courts have used background purposes, not to
make sense of the law, but to impose their own
views about sound policy.114 We could know far
more than we now do about whether state or fed
eral courts have done well or poorly when they have
consulted purposes, attempted to avoid absurdities,
or invoked background principles within the legal
system. One empirical project would involve com
parisons among the courts of different states, to see
if large differences can be found in interpretive be
havior. It might also be useful to investigate why dif
ferences among state courts might exist, either ex
plicitly in canons of construction or implicitly in
decisions themselves. For example, the size and
complexity of government in states like New York
or California might cut in one direction, while a less
populous or more compact state might take a differ
ent position simply because the legislature has a
greater ability to anticipate and solve problems as
they arise. Another such project would involve
·comparisons over time to see if courts have changed
from formalist to nonformalist approaches, or vice
versa, and to see the antecedents and consequences
of such shifts.
We do not suggest that these empirical projects would be sim
ple to execute,115 or that they would lead to uncontroversial nor
mative recommendations. Our central claims are that first-best
theories are incomplete without an acknowledgement of the im
portance of the questions j ust identified, and that it is not possible
to deduce, from large claims about legitimacy or authority, an an
swer to the reasonably disputed questions of interpretive choice.
Precisely because the empirical study of interpretation remains in
an extremely primitive state, there is every reason to think that
much will be gained by further empirical efforts.

1 14. See the references in note 116, infra, which address this issue in the context of
the development of pre-New Deal case law.
115. A good model is provided by INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPAR ATIVE
STUDY (D. Neil MacCorrnick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). The leading study
of congressional overrulings of judicial interpretations is William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991),
and a great deal might be done to build on Eskridge's findings.
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III. IMPLICATIONS
In the foregoing we have argued for something akin to an insti
tutional turn in interpretive theory. What reforms of statutory and
constitutional interpretation would such a turn counsel, if it were
accomplished'? What changes might it produce in public law, if im
·
plemented'? Here we will sketch, lightly, some possible implica
tions of a resolutely institutional approach to statutory interpreta
tion by courts (Section A), statutory interpretation by agencies
(Section B), and constitutional interpretation by courts (Section
C). Our aim, as throughout, is not to defend any particular sub
stantive approach to interpretation, but to show how the institu
tional lens refocuses the relevant questions.
A.

Formalism and Empiricism

Implicit in much of Part II was the straightforward idea that in
terpretive formalism might best be defended on empirical and in
stitutional grounds. Here we will amplify that idea by indicating
the line of argument that such a defense would have to take. We
will focus on courts and legislatures, bracketing important ques
tions about agency interpretation and judicial interpretation in a
world of agencies, questions taken. up in Section B.
A good beginning is to distinguish two senses of the protean
word "formalism." In one sense, formalism refers to a type of justi
fication for legal rulings or doctrines, namely a conceptualistic or
essentialist justification. For a large-scale example, consider the
Langdellian claim that law, properly so-called, must necessarily be
organized by deduction from self-evident first principles. For a
small-scale example, consider the Supreme Court's occasional
embrace of conceptualistic jurisprudence in constitutional law,
such as the essentialist distinction between "manufacturing" and
"commerce,"116 or between "legislative" and "executive" power.1 17
In a very different sense, explicated by Frederick Schauer
among others,1 18 formalism refers to a particular decisionmaking
strategy that courts might follow. Here courts make a second-

116. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). On the similarities and
differences between Langdellian formalism and the formalism of the pre-New Deal
Court, see Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 6-9, at http:/lpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=200732.
1 17. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 91 9 ( 1 983).
118. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); see
also Grey, supra note 116, at 4 (identifying a strand of formalism that emphasizes rule
following and legal determinacy).
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order decision119 to decide cases, where possible, according to rules
rather than standards, placing great emphasis upon the value of
legal certainty and the value of adhering to common understand
ings of constitutional and statutory commands. On this account, a
j udicial preference for formalist decisionmaking need not and
cannot rest upoi:i a deduction from any superior source of princi
ples, such as the Constitution or some definition of law's essence.
Formalism is justified, if at all, by reference to a claim that forma.1 ism will improve the legal system in relevant respects, with
improvement defined by reference to social goods exterior to law
itself.
After the institutional turn, we will say, formalism in the
second sense can be seen as a potentially sensible decisionmaking
strategy for courts interpreting statutes. Formalism in this sense
would counsel that courts stick close to the surface meaning of
texts, where possible, and place great emphasis on promoting, ex
ante, the clarity of legal commands and the intelligibility of the
default rules against which legislatures must draft statutes in the
first instance. The formalist j udge would generally decline to at
tempt to mold statutes to fit their purposes or intentions, would
hesitate to declare the apparent import of statutory text "absurd,"
and would narrow the range of outside sources admissible to
impeach textual meanings. It is no objection to formalism, so con
ceived, to parrot the banality that texts are "clear" only by refer
ence to the practices of some linguistic community. That is cer
tainly true, but it doesn't mean that no text is clear.120 If so, then
courts might choose to be formalists, not by pretending that all
texts are self-interpreting in some context-free sense, but on good
consequentialist grounds, thinking that things will be better if
courts emphasize the surface or apparent meaning of texts (as con
stituted by relevant assumptions and practices), rather than
impeaching them by reference to other sources and considerations.
The significance of the institutional turn, on this view, is just to
make clear that formalism in the second, operational sense cannot
itself be justified by formalism in the first, j ustificatory sense. For
malism cannot be justified (or opposed) by an appeal to self
evident constitutional principles, to the nature of democracy or
lawmaking, or to a definition of law. Conversely, however, for
malism as a decisionmaking strategy in statutory interpretation, or
for that matter in any other setting, can be justified or opposed
1 1 9. See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 1 10
ETHICS 5 (1 999).
1 20. See Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 96, at 191 ("No text is clear except in
terms of a linguistic and cultural environment, but it doesn't follow that no text is
clear." ).
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(solely) on the basis of a forward-looking assessment of the conse
quences of the competing alternatives. Just as Manning errs by ar
guing for formalism by reference to formal sources, so Eskridge
errs by engaging Manning on the same terrain in order to oppose
formalism.121 The correct ground for opposing formalism is that
antiformalism will produce better consequences for public law
than formalism.
Why might it be true (or false) that formalism in the second
sense would be the best interpretive method for courts to follow?
What would we have to know about the consequences of the com
peting alternatives to know whether courts should subscribe to
formalism? The variables are numerous, but can be herded into
two large categories: the performance of the interpreting j udges,
and the systemic effects of the judges' interpretive rules on other
actors. The former category subsumes the costs of mistaken
rulings, of Type I and Type II errors, and also the costs of
decisionmaking itself. The latter category subsumes a ·range of
questions about the effect of the judiciary's interpretive rules on
legislative drafting costs and the costs of administrative rulemak
ing, on citizens' and agencies' compliance with law, and on the be
havior of other courts, including both lower courts and future
courts at the same level of the legal hierarchy.
.
A commitment to interpretive formalism, in the operational
sense, would follow from particular views about the values of these
two (classes of) variables. On a dim assessment of the performance
of interpreting judges, for example, interpretive formalism will
appear more attractive than antiformalism. Relevant here are
many questions about the manageability of alternative interpretive
sources, such as legislative history and canons of construction, and
about the limits of judicial information. A court interpreting under
tight constraints of time and information may do better to ignore
or subordinate interpretive sources, like legislative history, whose
large volume and unfamiliar components could often provoke j u
dicial error. For similar reasons a court staffed by generalist judges
might do better, all else equal, by sticking to the apparent or
common meaning of texts and by eschewing empirically ambitious
innovations in statutory policy. A specialized court, by contrast,
would often do better with antiformalist interpretive techniques
that give free play to the court's superior appreciation of legisla
tive intentions, interest group deals, statutory policies, and social
and economic consequences. Here an important institutional com
plication, needing detailed study, is the existence of specialized
courts or judges whose decisions are reviewed by generalist
121.

For a recap of this debate, see supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text
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j udges.122 {In Section B we will argue, along the same lines, that
specialist administrative agencies might often wield nontextualist
interpretive techniques more successfully than generalist courts;
specialized courts are an intermediate case).
So too, interpretive formalism will look more attractive on cer
tain empirical assumptions about feedback effects on legislative
behavior, or system effects more generally. Suppose that judicial
formalism would produce more careful legislative drafting,
ex ante, and would encourage the development of corrective
mechanisms, ex post, such as the "Corrections Day" procedure re
cently instituted by the House of Representatives.123 These possi
bilities are the ones overlooked by Posner in his claim that the
sloppiness of American legislatures requires American courts to
adopt an antiformalist stance.124 It is possible that the effects run in
the other direction; to the extent that they do, formalism should be
preferred as the approach that will push the interpretive system,
taken as a whole, in desirable directions.
Law professors, who are usually highly specialized in some par
ticular field or other, often miss these points about the limited
competence of generalist j udges.125 It is very common to see a law
professor complaining that some generalist court has blundered in
its latest interpretation of the specialized statute that the professor
has made a career of studying; usually the blunder occurs because
the court has, in the critic's view, interpreted "woodenly,"
"mechanically," or "formalistically," with insufficient attention to
history, policy, and nuance. In such cases there is a kind of selec
tion bias in play. By interpreting woodenly, sticking close to ap
parent meaning, the court increases the risk of one sort of error
(the sort the critic castigates). But the court decreases the risk of
another, opposite sort of error - the error that an intellectually
ambitious antiformalist court would make by misreading statutory
purposes, misidentifying sensible text as absurd, or mispredicting

1 22. An example is bankruptcy; fo r some helpful sources, see Karen M.
Gebbia-Pinelli, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173 (2000).
1 23. See John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1 267 (1996).
124. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 99.
1 25. See, e.g., Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 122, at 297 ("Advocates, lower court
judges, and bankruptcy scholars can, and should, help the Court better understand the
music of the Bankruptcy Code" through "thoughtfully written briefs, opinions. and law
review articles that place the text of disputed Bankruptcy Code provisions in the
context of the linguistic and substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code" and "place
the text in the context of the development of bankruptcy doctrine over time."). For a
sophisticated exposition of the costs and benefits of formalist interpretation by gener
alist judges in a specialized area, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's
Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 SUP. Cr. REV. 393.
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the consequences of its rulings.126 Where courts are more often
formalist than not, the law professor rarely sees that kind of error
and rarely complains about it.
There is a useful analogy to ethics here. The choice between in
terpretive formalism and antiformalism has some of the same
intellectual structure as the choice between rule-utilitarianism and
act-utilitarianism. The rule-utilitarian will often be placed in the
awkward position of defending acts whose immediate effect is,
when viewed in isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it is the
easiest thing in the world for law professors to mention specific
cases in which formalism produces blunders, relative to a nuanced
antiformalism that is sensitive to the particulars of cases. In both
legal and ethical settings, however, the second-order, rule-based
decisionmaking strategies look more appealing where the deci
sionmaker cannot be trusted to identify socially beneficial acts or
appealing conceptions of statutory purpose.
Our emphasis on institutional considerations derives some
support from comparing interpretation in England with that in the
United States.127 In England, interpretation is far more rigid than
in the United States. The British Parliament is less likely to
delegate discretionary authority to judges. For their part, English
judges tend to treat statutes as rules, generally refusing to investi
gate whether the particular application of the rule makes sense as
a matter of policy or principle. Institutional differences help
explain the situation. In England, drafting is done by an Office
of Parliamentary Counsel, a highly professional body with
considerable experience in ensuring against inadvertent mistakes.
The Parliamentary Counsel attempts to prom.qte a uniform style of
drafting. The Counsel is also closely attuned to the . method.s of
English judges. The judges' practice is itself uniform and relatively
simple. Parliament revisits statutes with some fryquency, and it
fixes mistakes that are shown as such when particular cases arise.128
In the United States, by contrast, there is no centralized draft
ing body and hence less uniformity in terminology. There is less
professionalization in the production of statutes. The drafters of
legislation are multiple and uncoordinated. Congress appears only
1 26. Here we are eliding many questions about the internal design of the judicial
system. The availability of appeals might, in principle. either deter or encourage error
by trial courts. These issues are precisely the sort that we want to put on the agenda of
interpretive theory.
1 27. We draw in this Section on P S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. S UMMERS, FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY. AND LEGAL I NSTITUTIONS ( 1 987).
.

1 28. We are here generalizing, and eliding a great deal of important detail. The
English courts, for example, in the recent past abandoned their traditional practice of
refusing to consult Parliamentary history. See Pepper v. Hart, I All E.R. 42 (1993).
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intermittently aware of the j udges' interpretive practices, which
are themselves not easy to describe in light of the sheer size of the
federal j udiciary and the existence of sharp splits, on just this
point, within the Supreme Court. It would be wrong to say that
Congress is oblivious to j udicial decisions interpreting statutes.129
But Congress is not in the business of responding rapidly and
regularly to particular cases in which interpretations, literal or
otherwise, tend to misfire. Hence both lawmaking and law
interpreting practice are very different here from in England.
This brief description connects well with the suggestion that
the case for formalism depends on institutional competence and on
empirical matters. Roughly speaking, the English lawmaking sys
tem displays active, professionalized legislative oversight and a
formalist j udiciary, while the American lawmaking system is dif
ferent on both counts. None of this suggests that institutional ca
pacities are somehow irrevocably fixed in the two countries, or
that American courts must necessarily adopt an antiformalist
stance. That is the mistaken view that Richard Posner advances; as
we have seen, his view overlooks the possibility that institutional
capacities might themselves be affected by the interpretive rules
courts use, so that the adoption of a formalist stanc� by American
courts might spur American legislatures to increased activity.130
The important point is just that the two legal systems are highly re
sponsive to their own distinctive institutions. The debate over in
terpretive formalism turns, most critically, on the structure of the
lawmaking system rather than on claims about the nature of com
munication, democracy, or jurisprudential principles.
B.

A gencies and Courts

How shoul<;l courts approach agency in
terpretations of law? Should courts decide legal questions on their
own, or should they give some weight to the views of the relevant
agency? For many years the answer to this question was sharply
disputed. It received an authoritative answer in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc. ,131 which sets out a
two-step inquiry. Under step one, the question is whether
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," or
The Chevron question.

1 29. See Eskridge, Dynamic Swtutory Interpretation, supra note 75, at 1 530-33
(noting that, for political reasons, Congress may eschew clarity in statutory drafting and
rely on the courts to provide the necessary clarifying interpretations).
1 30. The switch would itself produce transition costs, to be netted against the bene
fits of the new regime. This is the sort of institutional variable that the style of analysis
we urge would take into account.
1 3 1 . 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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whether Congress has unambiguously banned what the agency
proposes to do.132 Under step two, courts ask whether the agency's
interpretation of the statute is "based on a permissible construc
tion of the statute."133 The result is that under Chevron, agency in
terpretations of law should be upheld if they are reasonable and if
they do not contradict the clear instructions of Congress. The court
is not authorized to reject the agency's interpretation merely be
cause of disagreement.
How is Chevron to be evaluated? It is generally agreed that
courts must follow congressional instructions on the question of
deference - that if Congress has unambiguously instructed courts
to defer to agency interpretations of law, or not to do so, courts
must do as Congress says.134 With this premise, many people have
defended Chevron, or challenged Chevron, by reference to
enacted Jaw. Some urge, for example, that the Administrative
Procedure Act, which asks courts to "decide relevant questions of
law,"135 argues in favor of an independent judicial judgment on the
legal question. But on reflection, statutory law is generally inde
terminate on the crucial question. To be sure, courts are told to
decide relevant questions of law; but under statutes in which agen
cies are exercising delegated authority, perhaps the meaning of the
relevant law is what agencies say that it is. At the very least, this is
a plausible reading of statutes that delegate rulemaking and adju
dicative authority to agencies. Plausible, but not necessary; candid
observers, on all sides, acknowledge that Congress has not authori
tatively required or forbidden the Chevron principle.136
We think that the best defenses of Chevron attempt to read
ambiguous congressional instructions in a way that is well-attuned
to institutional considerations. As the simplest illustration, con
sider Peter Strauss's defense of Chevron. 137 Strauss emphasizes
that the Supreme Court is able to resolve a small percentage of
cases involving ambiguities in regulatory law. He suggests that
because of the sheer number of courts of appeals, independent ju
dicial interpretations of regulatory law would make it extremely
difficult to ensure national uniformity. If Chevron is followed
1 32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
1 33. Id. at 843.
134. See generally Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. l (1983).
135. 5

u.s.c.

§ 706 (2000).

1 36. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 51 1 .
137. Peter Strauss, One f-111ndred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some lmplicatiol!S of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 093 { 1 987).

February 2003)

Interpretation and Institutions

faithfully, agency interpretations will be authoritative unless there
has been clear error; and this means that if the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), or the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") interprets its governing statute in a particular way,
national law is likely to be genuinely national. If Chevron were not
the law, and were not followed faithfully, it is inevitable that regu
latory law - involving, for example, the environment, communica
tions, and labor-management relations - will be highly variable
across the country. Chevron therefore works against balkanization
of federal Jaw.
This consideration need not be decisive. But other institutional
points are relevant. The resolution of statutory ambiguities must,
in many cases, depend on judgments of fact and value. Does the
word "source," as used in the Clean Air Act, refer to particular
smoke stacks or to plants?138 Does the word "harm," as used in the
Endangered Species Act, refer to intentional or reckless killings,
or destruction of habitat as well?139 It is reasonable to think that by
virtue of their specialized competence and relative accountability,
agencies are in a better position to make these decisions than
courts.
In making this suggestion, we mean to draw attention to two
ways of analyzing the Chevron problem. The first, and perhaps the
most common, is to speak in terms of constitutional considera
tions, separation of powers,140 and congressional instructions. We
agree that if any of these were clear, the question would be at an
end. But here, as in many other contexts, the relevant sources of
law do not resolve the choice of interpretive rules. The second way
of analyzing Chevron is frankly institutional. Our submission here
is that the institutional arguments, however they might be
resolved, are the best way to think about the problem.
This submission has broader implications as well. For example,
consider the recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,141
which grants Chevron deference to all products of rulemaking and
1 38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837-40.
139. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
140. The most obvious idea here includes the nondelegation doctrine, forbidding
Congress from granting open-ended discretionary power to administrative agencies.
One of us has argued that Chevron is in tension with the nondelegation doctrine,
because it increases the discretionary power of agencies. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Constit11tionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 , 468 (1987). On the other
hand, Sunstein no longer believes this, and Vermeule thinks that the Constitution con
tains no nondelegation principle. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
141. 533 U.S. 218 (2001 ).
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formal adjudication, but which uses a complex, multifaceted analy
sis to determine whether Chevron applies in other circumstances.
The institutional perspective raises the possibility that Mead might
be wrong, not because Congress intends otherwise, but because
the institutional variables call for defe rence where Mead .refuses it.
Suppose that lower courts and litigants struggle with Mead, ap
plying the new framework clumsily because it combines rules and
standards in confusing ways; or suppose that the additional deci
sion costs attributable to Mead come to appear extremely high, in
that lower courts spend a great deal of time on complicated pre
liminary questions about deference, even in cases whose merits are
easy one way or another.142 Given these or similar findings, Mead
would appear hard to defend, quite apart from one's views on the
contested questions of high interpretive theory.
A simple submission. Now let us link two parts of the discus
sion thus far. Suppose we conclude that for many American courts,
much of the time, some form of textualism is the best approach to
statutory interpretation. Suppose that we also conclude that
Chevron is correct. Must agencies be textualists? This question has
no clear answer under current law. We urge here that attention to
institutional considerations can show why agencies might be given
the authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be
denied that authority.
Two points are relevant here. First, agencies are likely to be in
a better position to decide whether departures from the text
actually make sense. This is so mostly because agencies have a
superior degree of technical competence; but it is not irrelevant
that agencies are subject to a degree of democratic supervision.143
Second, agencies are likely to be in a better position to know
whether departures from the text will seriously diminish predict
ability or otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme. If agencies are
not concerned about the risk of unsettlement, there is some reason
to think that the risk is low. Our suggestion is that because of these
points, the case for formalistic interpretation from judges might
well be stronger than the case for formalistic interpretation by
agencies.
In fact, a number of decisions seem to show an implicit agree
ment with this point. The leading case is A merican Water Works

1 42. For a study suggesting that these possibilities in fact describe the D.C. Circuit's
performance after Mead, see Adrian Vermeule, Introduction to the Annual Review of
the D. C. Circuit: Mead in the Trenches, Tl GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
1 43. Much of this supervision comes from the President. See JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 1 52-56 ( 1 997).
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EPA.144 The case involved a creative approach by the
EPA to the regulation of lead in drinking water. The Safe
Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to produce maximum con
taminant level goals ("MCLG") for water contaminants.145 These
goals must "be set at the level at which no known or anticipated
adverse effects on the health of persons occur," with an adequate
margin of safety.146 The EPA's MCLG for lead was zero, because
no safe threshold had been established. Once an MCLG is estab
lished, the EPA is required to set a maximum contaminant level
("MCL"), "as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as is
feasible."147 The EPA is authorized not to set a maximum con
taminant level, and to require "the use of a treatment technique in
lieu of establishing" that level, if (and only if) it finds "that it is not
economically or technologically feasible to ascertain the level of
the contaminant. "148
For lead, then, the EPA would be expected to set its MCL as
close as "feasible" (economically and technologically) to the
MCLG of zero, except if it was not "feasible" to ascertain the level
of lead contamination (and no one urged that the task of ascer
tainment was not feasible). But this is not what the EPA did, be
cause of some distinctive fe atures of the lead problem. Source
water is basically lead-free; the real problem comes from corrosion
of service lines and plumbing materials. With this point in mind,
the EPA refused to set any MCL for lead. The EPA reasoned that
an MCL would require public water systems to µse extremely
aggressive corrosion control techniques, which, while economically
and technologically "feasible," would be counterproductive, be
cause they would increase the level of other contaminants in the
water. What appeared to be the legally mandated solution would
make the water less safe, not more so. The EPA therefore chose a
more subtle and modest approach. Instead of issuing an MCL, it
required all large water systems to institute certain corrosion con
trol treatment, and required smaller systems to do so if and only if
representative sampling found significant lead contamination.
The EPA did not contend that an MCL was not "fe asible" to
implement, nor did it argue that it was not "feasible," in the eco
nomic or technological sense, to monitor lead levels in water.
Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency's decision.149 The court

Ass'n v.

1 44.

40 F.3d

1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

145. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l (b) (2000) .
1 46. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b)(4)(A).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(4)(B).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b){7){A).
1 49. American Water Works, 40 F.3d at 1 27 1 .
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accepted the EPA 's seemingly implausible suggestion that the
word "feasible" could be construed to mean "capable of being ac
complished in a manner consistent with the Act."150 The court said
that the "case law is replete with examples of statutes the ordinary
meaning of which is not necessarily what the Congress intended,"
and it added, pointedly and controversially, that "where a literal
meaning of a statutory term would lead to absurd results," that
term "has no plain meaning."151 Because an MCL would itself lead
to more contamination, "it could lead to a result squarely at odds
with the purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act."152
The court therefore accepted the EPA's view "that requiring
public water systems to design and implement custom corrosion
control plans for lead will result in optimal treatment of drinking
water overall, i.e. treatment that deals adequately with lead
without causing public water systems to violate drinking water
regulations for other contaminants."153 It should be plain that the
court permitted a quite surprising, and even countertextual, inter
pretation of the Act. The statutory terms seem to make no room
for the EPA's refusal to issue an MCL. In upholding the EPA's re
fusal, the court authorized the agency to avoid an unreasonable
result.
Qualifications. We believe that agencies should not be required
to interpret statutes in the same way as courts; but any judgment
on this point itself depends on contextual factors. If, for example,
Congress would immediately and costlessly correct the problems
that would be produced by formalism, then there would be much
less need to allow interpretations of the kind upheld in American
Water Works. In a legal universe where Congress can be expected
to correct the problem in that case - if it is indeed a problem the pressure for agency correction would be greatly reduced. And
there are other possible problems. Suppose that, in a world not so
very different from our own, agencies are systematically distrusted,
in part because they' are not technically expert after all, in part be
cause they are highly susceptible to the power of self-interested
private groups that move agency decisions in predictable direc
tions. In such a world, the argument for purposive agency interpre
tation, in the face of statutory text, would be very weak. And in
fact it is not difficult to imagine a legal system in which courts are,
and should be, authorized to engage in purposive interpretation,

1 50. Id. at 1270.
151. Id. at 127 1 .
152. Id.
153. Id.
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and in which agencies must follow the text unless courts specifi
cally instruct them not to do so.
With these points we are able to have a better understanding of
some continuing disputes about judicial review of agency action.
Notwithstanding American Water Works and similar decisions,154 a
number of cases insist that agencies adhere closely to statutory
text. If these outcomes are to be defended, it must be with an ex
pectation that Congress will correct the resulting problems, or with
a belief that agencies, authorized to depart from text, will move
regulatory law in undesirable directions.
Another contextual and empirical factor to consider is whether
a regime of purposive interpretation by agencies and textualist
interpretation by courts would be stable. We might imagine,
pessimistically, that the anticipation of j udicial review by textualist
courts would cause agencies to adopt textualist methods, simply to
maximize the chances of having their decisions sustained; agencies'
authority to depart from textualism would then become strictly
nominal. If so, it would provide a reason, all else equal, for courts
and agencies to adopt the same interpretive approach, although we
would still face the important choice between across-the-board
textualism or across-the-board purposivism. But we might also
imagine, more optimistically, that reviewing courts would defer to
agencies' adoption of a purposive interpretive style, even if the
same courts would adopt a textualist approach when deciding
cases with no agency in the picture. Chevron, after all, can easily
be understood to allow the agency some latitude to choose be
tween interpretive approaches and to vary from the approach the
court itself would adopt. In this scenario, the agency would have
no need to mimic the j udges' own interpretive approach, so a
regime of agency purposivism and j udicial textualism would not be
excessively unstable. These possibilities, like the considerations
above, exemplify the sort of institutional questions that a fully
developed analysis of agency interpretation must ask.
A rbitrariness and ossification: a final note on administrative law.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts are required to
set aside agency action that is "arbitrary" or "capricious."155 But
what do these terms mean? How should courts try to answer that
question? For much of the modern period of administrative law,
the answer has come from accounts of "agency failure."156 Drawing
1 54. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing
agency power to consider costs); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C.
<;;i r. 1 979) (recognizing agency power to make de minimis exceptions).
1 55. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2000).
156. See Michael B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
H ARV. L. REV. 1 667, 1684-87 ( 1 975).
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attention to administrative susceptibility to powerful private
groups, many critics, both on and off the federal bench, have en
dorsed the idea that courts should take a "hard look" at agency ac
tion, in order to reduce factional influences and promote better
policymaking.157
What has been ignored, for much of the life of the resulting
debate, are two sets of risks. The first involves judicial error, partly
a product of sheer ignorance.158 The second and more fundamental
involves systemic effects, above all in the form of large-scale
alterations in administrative behavior, produced by the very fact of
"hard look" review. It is now well-documented that such review
has contributed to the "ossification" of notice-and-comment rule
making, which now takes years, in part as a result of the effort to
fend off judicial challenges. In light of the risk of invalidation,
many agencies have turned away from notice-and-comment rule
making altogether - with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), for example, attempting to promote
automobile safety through ex post recalls, which is generally re
garded as a senseless way to proceed. Our claim here is that the
analysis of "hard look" review is ludicrously incomplete if it does
not pay attention to institutional considerations of this kind. And
indeed, some of the most impressive work in administrative law
attempts to incorporate judicial fallibility and dynamic effects into
ap account of how to assess whether agency action counts as "arbi
trary" under the APA.159
C.

Constitutional Interpretation

Overview. Our principal recommendation has been that inter
pretive theory in legislation and administrative law should take an
institutional turn. What of constitutional interpretation? Here we
will say that academic theory about constitutional law does far bet
ter, on the score of institutional sensitivity, than academic theory
about statutory interpretation. Constitutional theorists have, in
part, already taken the institutional turn, with important work be
ginning in the 1970s. At the same time, the turn is as yet incom
plete and has not been explicitly recognized as such; the treatment
of basic questions in constitutional law, such as judicial review, has

1 57. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Control of Systematic Inadequacies in Federal
Administrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407 ( 1978).
1 58. See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 9 1 HARV. L. REV. 1833 {1 978).
1 59. See, e.g., J ERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID H AFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY { 1 990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 59 ( 1995).
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always suffered from institutional blindness, and there remain im
portant pockets of contemporary theory that are resolutely oblivi
ous to second-best questions.
We will begin by emphasizing the extent to which the founda
tions of interpretive theory in constitutional law are deficient on
the score of institutional sensitivity. Here the critical case is, of
course, Marbury v. Madison1w and its inadequate (because exces
sively abstract and conceptual) justification for j udicial review.
After sketching the partial and salutary tum to institutional analy
sis in modem constitutional theory, and especially in the most re
cent work, we then discuss several important theorists who
exemplify the remaining, largely unreconstructed resistance to
institutional analysis: Ronald Dworkin, Akhil Amar, and
Lawrence Lessig. We mean to press claims that parallel our claims
about statutory interpretation. First, at a minimum, accounts of
constitutional interpretation are incomplete without reference to
institutional capacities. Second, and more ambitiously, institutional
considerations may enable constitutional lawyers to converge upon
interpretive approaches, while bracketing first-best accounts of
constitutionalism or simply remaining agnostic about them.
Marbury v. Madison. Is j udicial review desirable? Does the
Constitution call for it? These are old and much-debated ques
tions. Our modest goal here is to draw attention to a serious prob
lem: many of the most well-known arguments on behalf of j udicial
review, including those in Marbury itself, are blind to institutional
considerations. They ignore the risk of judicial error and the possi
bility of dynamic consequences, In American law, Chief Justice
John Marshall might even be deemed the father, or the founder, of
the kind of institutional blindness that we are criticizing.
Indeed, what is most striking about Marshall's arguments for
judicial review is that they depend on a series of fragile textual and

1 60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1 803). For a revealing example of an analysis of judicial
review that is not closely attuned to institutional variables, see Aharon Barak,
Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 11 6
HARV. L . REV. 1 6 (2002). Barak urges, for example, that the "social consensus around
fundamental views is usually what ought to guide judges, with regard to both the intro
duction of new fundamental principles and the removal from the system of fundamental
principles that have become discredited." Id. at 88. Barak continues that in some cases,
"the judge carries out his role properly by ignoring the prevailing consensus and be
coming the flagbearer of a new social consensus." Id. Now Barak is an extraordinary
distinguished judge, and his remarks on the judicial role are highly illuminating. But he
does not deal in any depth with the risk that judges will mistake the "social consensus
around fundamental views" or with the danger that a judge will make factual and moral
errors when "becoming the flagbearer of a new social consensus." American history is
replete with both risks. We emphasize that we are not necessarily disagreeing with
Barak's conclusions about the appropriate judicial role, for Israel or for anywhere else.
But we doubt that there is any single "role of a supreme court in a democracy," simply
because the relevant institutional variables will vary from place to place.
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structural inferences, ignoring the institutional issues at stake.
Much of Marshall's emphasis is on the unobjectionable claim that
the Constitution is "superior, paramount law";161 but it is possible
to accept that claim without also thinking that courts are author
ized to strike down statutes that violate that law. A constitution is
"superior, paramount law" in many legal systems that offer little or
no j udicial review of legislation. When Marshall famously asserts
that "[i)t is emphatically the province and duty of the j udicial de
partment to say what the law is,"162 he is offering a conclusion, not
an argument on its behalf. Marshall invokes the Supremacy
Clause,163 which certainly means that a law repugnant to the
Constitution must yield; but that clause offers nothing in support
of the institutional claim that courts have the power to strike down
laws that, in their j udgment, are unconstitutional. Marshall's tex
tual and structural inferences are very weak, and no source of con
stitutional meaning clearly settles the question. Any evaluation of
Marshall's conclusion must depend, in large part, on institutional
considerations.
If it appears odd to suggest that j udicial review need not be a
part of the American constitutional fabric, a reading of the histori
cal materials should dispel the appearance.164 Larry Kramer urges
that, for the framers, the "Constitution was not ordinary law, not
peculiarly the stuff of courts and j udges."165 Instead, it was "a spe
cial form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their
governors."166 For many members of the revolutionary generation,
constitutional principles were subject to "popular enforcement,"167
that is, public insistence on compliance with the Constitution
rather than judicial activity. "It was the legislature's delegated re
sponsibility to decide whether a proposed law was constitutionally
authorized, subject to oversight by the people. Courts simply had
nothing to do with it, and they were acting as interlopers if they
tried to second-guess the legislature's decision."168 Kramer traces

161 . Marbury, 5 U.S. at 1 77.
1 62. Id.
1 63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("Laws of the United States" made "in Pursuance [of
the Constitution) . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
1 64. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001 ).
165.

Id.

1 66.

Id.

at 10.

167. Id. at 40.
1 68. Id. at 49.
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the controversial early growth of the practice of j udicial review,
with many seeing it as an "act of resistance."169 At the Founding, a
handful of participants saw a role for judicial review, though few of
these imagined it as a powerful or important device, and none
seemed anxious to emphasize it. Others were opposed . . . . The vast
majority of participants were still thinking in terms of popular consti
tutionalisrn and so focused on traditional political means of enforcing
the new charter; the notion of judicial review simply never crossed
their rninds.170

In Kramer's account, constitutional limits would be enforced
not through courts, but as a result of republican institutions and
the citizenry's own commitment to its fo unding document. Kramer
raises serious doubts about the understanding in Marbury v.
Madison and in particular about judicial supremacy in the inter
pretation of the Constitution. He suggests that for some of the
Framers, judicial review was "a substitute for popular resistance"
and to be used "only when the unconstitutionality of a law was
clear beyond dispute."171 What is important for our purposes is the
idea that at the Founding, the supremacy of the Constitution was
clear, but judicial enforcement was not, in part because of am
bivalence about which institutions would be well-suited to ensur
ing compliance.
Of course, j udicial review is, at present, constitutionally re
spectable to say the least; we do not mean to argue against it here.
But it is easy to imagine constitutional systems that would refuse
to give judges the power to strike down legislation. If judges are
corrupt, biased, poorly informed, or otherwise unreliable, it would
hardly make sense to entrust them with that power. And if legisla
tive officials could be trusted to be faithful to constitutional com
mands, the need for j udicial review would be greatly diminished.
Or suppose that a constitutional system feared, with reason, that
the power of j udicial review would weaken the attention paid by
other institutions to constitutional requirements - so that j udicial
review, it was. thought, would weaken the grip of constitutional
limitations on other branches. This conjecture, empirical in charac
ter, has been made in the United States172 as elsewhere. If j udicial
review, or aggressive j udicial review, makes it less likely that other
branches will follow the Constitution, perhaps judicial review
should be weakened or exercised less frequently, with invocation
of justiciability doctrines to limit the judicial role. A system of this
169. Id. at 54.
1 70. Id. at 67.
171. Id. at 74.
172. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901 ).
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kind might be accepted by people who believe emphatically in
constitutionalism, but who think that judicial review will tend to
undermine rather than to promote its goals. Hence the analysis of
the Marbury question itself must depend, in part, on the same con
siderations that we have been stressing throughout.
It is possible to draw a general conclusion. In many domains,
the question is posed whether one institution should review the
acts of another, and if so, the intensity with which that review
should occur. This question arises, for example, in the context of
constitutional challenges; attacks on criminal convictions; review
of punitive damage awards by juries; appellate review of trial court
findings; and judicial review of agency decisions of law, fact, and
policy. In all of these areas, it is important to pay close attention to
institutional variables. The costs of error and the costs of decision
are crucial. It is necessary to examine dynamic effects. There is no
sensible acontextual position on the question whether review, of
one institution or another, should be intense or deferential, or
indeed available at all.
Modern constitutional theory. We do not mean to claim that
Marbury's institutional blindness fairly represents all of subse
quent constitutional theory in America. Many important strands of
post-Marbury theory have been grounded in accounts of institu
tional capacities. Most familiar is Thayer's idea that the
Constitution might properly be treated, or interpreted, in one way
by a legislature and another way by a court, in light of the distinc
tive characteristics of the interpreting institution.173 Among the
modern refinements of this idea are Alexander Bickel's legal
process account of the distinctive attributes of courts as constitu
tional interpreters, although that account glorified courts' insula
tion ("the ways of the scholar")174 while overlooking the informa
tional deficits that insulation produces;175 and Lawrence Sager's
idea that legislatures might properly be charged with responsibility
for underenforced constitutional norms.176 In general, it is unsur
prising that a body of theory pervasively structured around the
countermajoritarian difficulty should display some sensitivity to
institutional role, if only in the stylized abstract manner of the
legal process tradition. In this light, it is perhaps most accurate to

1 73. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1 893).
174. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 {2d ed.
1 986).
175. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 55-56 ( 1977).
176. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constiflltional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 212 (1978).
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say that constitutional theory has always taken some account of
the institutional determinants of interpretation.
Indeed, new contributions, of the 1990s and after, have
displayed an increasingly sophisticated treatment of institutional
attributes and capacities. First, lawyer-economists like Neil
Komesar and Einer Elhauge drew upon transaction-cost econom
ics177 and interest-group theory178 to refute simple arguments for an
aggressive judicial posture in constitutional cases - what Komesar
calls "single-institutional" arguments - that fail to compare all
relevant costs and benefits of the available institutional alterna
tives.179 Consider the standard line that judges should intervene to
correct failures in political markets. Formulated in a traditional le
gal process vocabulary by John Hart Ely,180 this view was trans
lated into the vocabulary of public choice by libertarians and free
marketeers in the 1980s. Komesar and Elhauge, however, make
clear that process failures in the form of rent-seeking activity and
differential interest-group access afflict the · courts as well
(Elhauge), and that whatever relative insulation judges enjoy
comes at the price of severe informational deficits (Komesar), so
that the j udges are prone to stumble into empirical pitfalls. The
premise of comparative j udicial advantage underlying the standard
line, then, is at best questionable, and defending that line has
become far more complicated business.181
A second, currently influential strand in recent constitutional
theory might be called neo-Thayerian; it is represented by Jeremy
Waldron, Mark Tushnet, and Larry Kramer, among others.
Waldron has examined how legislative institutions help to resolve
otherwise intractable political disagreements;182 Tushnet has re
vived and enriched the Thayerian concern with the debilitating ef
fects of judicial guardianship on legislative performance;183 and
Kramer, as we have seen, has worked to dispel overheated claims
on behalf of ambitious, interventionist judicial review, especially

177. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, I MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
I NSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).

CHOOSING

1 78. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
179. KOMESAR, supra note 1 77, at 6.
1 80. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
181. See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial A ctivism
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 221-22 (1 997) (responding to Elhauge and
Komesar).
182. See JEREMY w ALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
183. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAy FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
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by impeaching its historical pedigree.184 In general, the stylized ab
stractions about legislative and judicial capacities familiar to legal
process have been improved by successive doses of realism and
analytic sophistication, especially by the neo-Thayerians on the
legislative side and by the lawyer-economists on the judicial side
- although both camps have enriched our understanding across
the whole institutional system, as is fitting for approaches that em
phasize comparative institutional analysis and the avoidance of
nirvana fallacies.
These strands of recent constitutional theory might be de
scribed as involving institutional competence writ large; their focus
is on the large-scale allocation of responsibility, for policymaking
and lawmaking, between or among the courts and political
branches. To these salutary developments we wish to. add consid
erations of institutional competence writ small. To the extent that
interpretive authority over certain questions has been allocated to
the courts by some background theory of comparative compe
tence, there remains the question what interpretive rules courts
should use in constitutional cases. We will claim that important
strands of constitutional theory still attempt to answer ' this last
question in an institutional vacuum. The essential defect in these
accounts is that they are insufficiently sensitive to the identity and
capacities of the interpreter; they treat the interpreter, explicitly or
implicitly, as a theorist much like the constitutional theorist him
self, rather than a judicial bureaucrat deciding cases under con
straints of time, information, and expertise. We will consider three
examples: the interpretive accounts of Ronald Dworkin, Akhil
Amar, and Lawrence Lessig. In important respects these theorists
perpetuate, even amplify, the flaws in Marbury's logic.
Dworkin (redux), and a philosophical brief Dworkin's ap
proach to constitutional law is nicely illuminated by an unusual
brief submitted to the Supreme Court in the assisted suicide cases,
a document widely known as "The Philosophers' Brief."185 The
brief bears Dworkin's distinctive mark, and indeed Dworkin is
listed as lead counsel. The Philosophers' Brief offers an ambitious
argument, one with considerable appeal. It says that some "deeply
personal decisions pose controversial questions about how and
why human life has value. In a free society, individuals must be
allowed to make those decisions for themselves, out of their own
faith, conscience, and convictions."186 The brief urges that distinc1 84. See Kramer, supra note 1 64.
1 85. See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1 997, at 41 -42.
1 86. Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls,
Tho.mas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thompson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
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tions between "omissions"(failing to provide continued treatment)
and "acts"187 (providing drugs that will produce death) are "based
on a misunderstanding of the pertinent moral principles."188
Drawing on the abortion cases, the brief says that every person
"has a right to make the 'most intimate and personal decisions cen
tral to personal dignity and autonomy,' " a right that encompasses
"some control over the time and manner of one's death."189 The
brief thus urges the Court to declare a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide. Dworkin's personal gloss on the brief
says that it "defines a very general moral and constitutional princi
ple - that every competent person has the right to make momen
tous personal decisions, which invoke fundamental religious or
philosophical convictions about life 's value for himself."190
Simply as a matter of political morality, the argument in the
Philosopher's Brief is certainly reasonable and it cannot easily be
shown to be wrong. But suppose that the Court was convinced by
the argument in principle; should the Court have held that there is
a right to physician-assisted suicide? This is not so clear. Before
accepting the argument, it is necessary to ask about j udicial com
petence to evaluate moral arguments of this sort, and also to ask
about facts and incentives. Perhaps the Court is not especially
well-equipped to evaluate those arguments; and if consequences
matter, the moral arguments might not be decisive in light of the
risk that any right to physician-assisted suicide would, in practice,
undermine rather than promote the autonomy of patients.191
Many people, including Dworkin himself, appear to think that
the Supreme Court should not much hesitate to find a constitu
tional right of some kind if it is presented with convincing (to the
j udges) philosophical arguments for that right, at least if the right
"fits" with the rest of the legal fabric. For those who take an insti
tutional perspective, this view is wrong. Courts may not under
stand what justice requires, or may not be good at producing
j ustice even when they understand it. In these circumstances, their
understanding of the Constitution is partly a product of their
j udgments about their own distinctive role as a social institution.
Note that this claim does not depend on skepticism about moral or
·

dents at 5, Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 1 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), and Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 ( 1 997) (No. 95-1858).
1 87. Id. at 10-11 (distinguishing between �cts and omissions in the assisted-suicide
context).
1 88.

lei.

at I 1 .

1 89. Id. a t 20.
190. Dworkin et al., supra note 185, at 41.
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 1 06 YALE L.J. 1 1 23 (1997) (exploring
this possibility).
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political arguments. It is reasonable to believe that judges are not
well-equipped to engage in theoretically ambitious tasks, without
also believing that political theory is itself problematic or useless.
Amar. Akhil Amar provides a valuable discussion of a method
he labels "intratextualism."192 The term denotes a textualism that
makes extensive use of comparisons across clauses - a technique
capable of generating dramatic readings, such as the claim that the
key to understanding the meaning of "speech" in the First
Amendment is the meaning of "speech" in the Speech and Debate
Clause.193 Amar's target is what he calls "clause-bound" interpreta
tion, the judicial practice of reading constitutional provisions and
their accompanying history and precedent in (partial) isolation
from textually related provisions.
In its emphasis on the authority of constitutional text, and in its
populist underpinnings, Amar's account appears to lie at some
polar opposite from Dworkin's, in which the constitutional text
does relatively little work and populism is hardly a defining ideal.
Yet for our purposes the two accounts overlap. What Dworkin and
Amar share is a deep interest in a sort of constitutional holism: a
commitment to attempting, if fairly possible, to read the
Constitution (whether that is taken to denote the document's text
or the moral principles underlying constitutional law) as a coher
ent, integrated whole. It is this shared feature of holism or coher
entism that unites our critique · of Dworkin with our critique of
Amar. To his credit, Amar is not oblivious to the problem, but we
think he devotes insufficient attention to the possibility that real
world judges charged with holistic interpretation will simply blun
der, producing a pattern of incoherent outcomes, or, worse yet,
producing an internally coherent but morally misguided vision of
public law.194
Amar recommends intratextualism as tool suitable to the
courtroom as well as the classroom; indeed most of Amar's
intratextualist heroes are famous j udges, especially John Marshall.
Yet despite noting judicial blunders, Amar does not give sustained
attention to the institutional capacities of the real-world j udges
who would be charged with practicing intratextualism; he does not
offer a careful treatment of j udges' interpretive capacities or their
likely performance under the alterna�ive regimes of intratextual
ism, on one hand, and clause-bound interpretation, on the other.
1 92. See Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextua/ism, 1 1 2 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1 999).
1.93. Id. at 815-16.
194. See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young,_ Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with lntratextualism, 1 1 3 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000). For Amar's recognition of
the problem, see Amar, supra note 1 92, at 775-78 (suggesting blundering uses of
intratextualism); id. at 799-802 (discussing weakness of the method).
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Compared to the clause-bound alternative, intratextualism re
quires a more complicated and information-intensive inquiry, one
that will reduce decisional accuracy whenever j udges read the
comparison texts mistakenly. So, for example, a judge who looks
to the Speech and Debate Clause to illuminate the Free Speech
Clause might go badly wrong, given that the former provision
predates the First Amendment and addresses very different
problems. In the abstract, there is no reason to think that the
illuminating effect of intratexualism will predominate over its
error-producing effect.
What's worse, intratextualism in the hands of fallible judges
risks producing a holistic, highly coherent, but fundamentally
mistaken analysis, one that constitutionalizes a simultaneous
misreading of a whole set of related provisions. Justice Douglas's
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,195 for example, offered a holis
tic, coherent account of the Bill of Rights as based upon a general
principle of privacy; and it is an account that Amar himself thinks
is deeply mistaken.196 Those with a realistic view of j udges' abilities
as constitutional interpreters might prefer the limited incoherence
of clause-bound interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erro
neous universal account.
L essig, Interp retation as Translation, and Compensating
A djustments. Similar problems beset Lawrence Lessig's valuable

account of constitutional interpretation, which sees that practice as
an exercise in "translation."197 Translation is a particular version of
originalism, of "fidelity" to the Constitution of the founding era.198
Lessig's important insight is that j udges might, in principle, act
more faithfully to the original Constitution by updating constitu
tional rules to meet changed circumstances than by adhering
woodenly to the specific text chosen by the founding generation,
or to their specific expectations. Just as a translator might do bet
ter to choose a colloquial analog that captures the flavor of the
original, rather than simply using a literal equivalent, so too the
original meaning of the constitutional structure might, in changed ,
circumstances, best be preserved by departures from the original
understanding. In the area of federalism, for example, Lessig urges
the Court to "make up" constitutional rules that restore the origi195. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
196. Amar, supra note 1 92, at 797 & n.196. In Amar's view, the key to a coherentist
reading of the Bill of Rights is constitutional populism, not libertarian privacy. See gen
erally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE B I LL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
1 97. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1 171 n.32
(1 993).
1 98. See id. at 1 169-73.
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nal balance between federal and state authority.199 " [T]o be faithful
to the constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be
unfaithful to the constitutional text."200
Translation is, without doubt, a useful contribution to first-best
theorizing about constitutional interpretation. No other such
account has, in recent years, generated as much comment and as
many engaging applications.201 Translation is best viewed as a
refinement of purposivism: like Hart and Sacks's approach,202
translation boosts the level of interpretive generality from the spe
cific intentions or expectations of a law's framers to their ultimate
aims or ends. But Lessig's account also shares purposivism's insen
sitivity to institutional considerations. Lessig fails to consider the
possibility that judges might be poor translators, garbling meanings
so badly that a simple-minded transliteration would preserve more
of the original than would an ambitious and mistaken attempt to
capture the original's real sense. Judicial mistakes might make
ambitious attempts at translation self-defeating, driving results fur
ther away from the original meaning rather than pushing results
closer to it. In the federalism setting, for example, it is by no means
obvious that making up rules to approximate the original balance
is, even on Lessig's theoretical premises, the right prescription for
the Court. The Court might overshoot the mark by announcing
stringent restrictions on federal authority that push constitutional
law further from the founding balance than would deference to
national political processes.203
Here is another example, taken not from Lessig's own work
but from the secondary literature applying Lessig's insights. Sup
pose that the original Constitution, rightly understood, bars dele
gations of legislative authority to the executive, and also bars the
legislative veto. (Of course we do not mean to endorse or oppose
either claim here). The circumstances of modern government are
such, however, that delegations of legislative authority are perva
sive, and there is no prospect of returning to the original under-

Cf.

1 99. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States
REV. 125, 1 92.

v.

Lopez. 1995 SUP.

200. Id. at 1 93.
201. See, e.g., Symposium, Fidelity in Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247
(1997).
202. HART & SACKS, supra note 1 4.
203. This was one of the themes of Justice Souter's dissent in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 ( 1 995). which argued, among other things, that deference to ra
tional congressional judgments about the scope of the interstate commerce power bet
ter captured the original understanding. See id., 514 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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standing in this regard.204 The translation theorist might argue that
j udges should vote to uphold the legislative veto, even though it is
clearly unconstitutional in isolation, on the ground that it is a
"compensating adjustment"205 needed to restore the original struc
tural balance among the branches of government.206 The legislative
veto will, on this view, allow the legislature to limit and police the
sweeping delegations of authority that it cannot avoid making. In
fact, Justice White's dissent in the decision that invalidated the
legislative veto urged upholding the veto on j ust this ground.207
Of course there is a competing account. Perhaps the legislative
veto falls afoul of the translated Constitution, because it aggra
vates the power of self-interested private groups over processes of
lawmaking, thus defeating the goal of bicameralism and present
ment, which is (on this view) to reduce the role of factions in gov
ernment. On this view, for the Court to uphold the legislative veto
might move public law farther away from, rather than closer to,
the structure and purposes of the original Constitution. Now this
view may be wrong. The problem is that it is no simple task to
identify the commitments of the Constitution that are to be trans
lated to fit with modern circumstances. As with purposes, so with
commitments: There is no simple task of discovery here.
We are confident that Lessig would not disagree with this
claim. But from the institutional perspective, the idea that j udges
should translate original structures by searching for offsetting
constitutional adj ustments is defective if unaccompanied by an
account of j udicial capacities. It takes great confidence in those
capacities to think that j udges can identify the net effects of such
large-scale reforms with enough precision to warrant jettisoning
clear constitutional provisions and settled constitutional rules. The
overall effect of the legislative veto, or of its invalidation, is a
major research question for experts in political science.208 There is
little reason to believe that generalist judges, devoting a brief time
to the subject and possessed of limited information, can form even
a plausible view of the relevant complexities. Judicial competence
is not the only problem with the idea of translation through com
pensating adj ustments; there are serious conceptual puzzles as
204. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
205. Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 1 1 1 YALE
1311, 1367 (2001 ).

LJ.

206. McCutchen, supra note 204, at 37-38.
207. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 994-95 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
208. See, e.g., JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 4-5 (1996).
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well.2w But for our purposes the important objection is that trans
lation assumes an optimistic account of the judges' abilities as
translators, an account that becomes increasingly questionable as
j udicial departures from text and original expectations become in
creasingly ambitious, and as the systemic effects of the adjustment
become increasingly difficult for generalist judges to predict.
Some generalizations. We can generalize these points about
Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig in two ways; both are familiar from
the earlier institutional account of �tatutory interpretation. The
first point is that a master principle of constitutional authority law as integrity (Dworkin), or the primacy of constitutional text
(Amar), or fidelity through translation (Lessig) - taken by itself,
can yield no conclusions at all about proper interpretive method.
With a certain assessment of judicial capacities, j udges might do
better, by Amar's own lights, with clause-bound interpretation
than with intratextualism. On Lessig's own premises, fallible
judges might be better translators if they stick to the unambitious
transliteration that Lessig disparages. As for Dworkin, consider
the possibility that a fallible judge charged with implementing
law-as-integrity might do better, from the moral point of view, by
opting for a relatively mechanical adherence to prior rulings,
described at a low level of generality, than by ambitiously
attempting to bring principled coherence to large areas of law.
Thus an epistemically humble Dworkinian judge might look a
great deal like the incremental, common law constitutional jurist,
who defers to precedent on the basis of a Burkean appreciation of
the limits of individuals' cognitive capacities.210
The second, larger point is the possibility of incompletely theo
rized agreements about interpretive method in constitutional
cases. Interpreters who hold various first-order accounts of consti
tutional authority might, for example, converge on a practice of
clause-bound precedent. The Amarian would do so to avoid large
scale, coherent mistakes by fallible intratextualist j udges; the
Dworkinian would do so because any more ambitious attempt at
justificatory ascent might predictably do worse, on Dworkin's own
criteria of moral integrity, in the hands of j udges who do not
resemble Hercules, Dworkin's idealized judge. Where agreements
209. Levinson observes that identifying a compensating adjustment depends upon
highly contestable judgments about the framing of constitutional problems: Why ex
actly should the constitutionality of the legislative veto be assessed in relation to the
nondelegation doctrine, rather than in isolation? Levinson, supra note 205, at 1 367-68.
We add that a critical factor, among others, in deciding upon the proper scope of the
transactional frame is the capacity of judges to manage the increased complexity of
larger frames.
2 10. This is the picture drawn in David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 ( 1 996).
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of this sort are possible, the underlying disagreements between
competing accounts of the Constitution's authority could be
bracketed or ignored; with respect at least to the role of precedent,
it would be possible to choose an approach to interpretation
without committing to any such first-best position.
To be sure, any of these stories might or might not be plausible;
the empirical agenda we mean to sketch would consist of investiga
tions along these and similar lines. The important point is j ust that
constitutional interpretation is not the same in a second-best world
as in a first-best world. As with statutes, so with the · constitution:
any account of constitutional interpretation that overlooks the de
cisive role of institutional considerations is for that reason defec
tive.
A note on tradition in constitutional law. These ideas very much
bear on the continuing debate about the proper role of tradition in
constitutional law. Justice Scalia, among others, has urged that in
the face of textual ambiguity, j udges should follow traditions de
scribed at a low-level of generality. They should not strike down
legislation unless it contravenes actual practices as vindicated by
history.21 1 "We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified."212 It would be possible to defend this approach
on Burkean grounds, with the claim that long-standing practices
are likely to be j ustified, or good, by virtue of their historical
pedigree. And for those who dislike Burke, it would be possible to
respond that long-standing practices might reflect power or arbi
trariness, and hence that tradition is a bad source of constitutional
law and (in particular) of constitutional rights.213 Much of the de
bate over tradition has been cast in these terms.
With an institutional focus, the debate looks very different.
Perhaps traditionalism is best defended on the ground that j udges
are highly fallible human beings, and that if they are unmoored
from either text or traditions, they might well make mistakes.214 In
fact, we could imagine a society, different but not unrecognizably
from our own, in which this defense of traditionalism would be
convincing to a diverse group of people. Suppose, for example,
that political processes functioned extremely well, in the sense that
unjust or ill-considered outcomes were highly unlikely, and were
corrected politically when they occurred. Suppose too that in such
211. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 1 10, 122-23 (1989).
212. Id. at 1 27 n.6.
2 13. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST 62 (1 980).
214. Justice Scalia suggests a similar point: "Because [general] traditions provide
such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
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a nation, judges were likely to make big blunders, in the form of
decisions that were confused or even invidious, and very hard to
correct once made. In such a society, tradition might well be the
best foundation of constitutional rights where text is unclear.
Perhaps other bright-line rules - such as a strong presumption in
favor of upholding enacted law - would be better still. The point
is that an evaluation of traditionalism, as of any other interpretive
method, is partly empirical, and based on an assessment of how
different institutions are likely to perform under the various alter
natives. Without some empirical projections, it is hard to venture
sensible answers.
D.

The Common Law

Our emphasis has been on the interpretation of texts, taken as
the sorts of commands found in constitutions, statutes, and regula
tions. But precedents are of course texts too, and in deciding what
a precedent means, a common law court should pay close attention
to institutional considerations. This point is often well-understood
in the common law context, especially in the academic literature
on contract interpretation,215 but not always, for academics often
evaluate common law decisions simply by asking whether the ex
isting cases can be unified by an attractive conceptual principle.
That is not the question courts should ask; at least it is not the only
question. When common law judges, as opposed to theorists of the
common law, decide whether to characterize precedents narrowly
or broadly, the questions of judicial fa llibility and of dynamic ef
fects are central.
Consider two currently disputed issues frequently faced by
common law courts: whether to expand employee protection
against at-will discharge216 and whether to discipline punitive
damage awards by juries.217 It would be possible to analyze prece
dents in a style akin to Dworkin's, asking what principle puts them
in the most attractive light. Under this approach, some people
would undoubtedly conclude that courts should limit the power of
employers to discharge employees, eventually creating, perhaps, a
215. The possibility of formalism in the operational. rule-based sense, justified on
the basis of claims about judicial competence and ex ante effects, has recently com
manded a great deal of interest in the literature on contract interpretation. See, e.g.,
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000) ; Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847 (2000).
2 1 6. For a helpful overview of this issue, see MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 680-99 (2d ed. 1999).
217. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, cert. granted, 70
U.S.L.W. 3580, (U.S. June 3, 2002) (No. 01 -1289).
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right to be fired only on job-related grounds. And other people
would undoubtedly erect barriers to apparently unreasonable
punitive damage awards, expanding judicial power of remittitur to
ensure, for example, a sensible relationship between the compen
satory award and the punitive award.
It should be clear that any effort to proceed in this way should
pay close attention to two problems. First, judges might not know
what they are doing. In the labor market, for example, some
observers suggest that arbitrary discharges are actually rare,218 and
that a right to be discharged only for job-related reasons would not
really protect deserving employees, but increase meritless Jitiga
tion, with employees being the victims (through reduced wages or
employment). Any significant shift in the common law could have
large systemic effects on the employment market, and courts are
not in a good position to anticipate those effects. With respect to
punitive damages, it is not so clear that there should be a sensible
relationship, all of the time, between the compensatory award and
the punitive award. If, for example, the injury is very hard to de
tect in most cases, the standard economic approach calls for a large
multiplier. In any case, state legislators have been very much in
volved in the process of considering relevant reforms. There has
been active debate in many states about the permissible grounds
for discharge, and even more active debate about cabining large
punitive damage awards. Perhaps judicial decisions, attractive in
principle, would dampen those debates. Perhaps cautious and in
cremental judgments, less attractive in principle, would represent a
form of deference to ongoing processes that are more likely to
settle the relevant areas well.
Here, as elsewhere, we do not mean to reach a final judgment
on the issues in question. And by drawing attention to institutional
considerations in the common law setting, we hope that we are not
saying anything surprising or novel. Too often, however, the insti
tutional considerations are placed in the background and the in
terpretation of precedents is undertaken in a way that is indiffer
ent to them.
E.

Rules, Standards, and the Institutional Lens

An emphasis on institutional considerations also bears on the
current debate over whether judges should attempt to decide on a
case-by-case basis or instead offer guidance through general rules.
In ruling on same-sex education, punitive damages, affirmative ac
tion, anti-loitering legislation, and more, should judges limit their
218. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, ln Defense of the Contract at
REV. 947, 970 ( 1984).
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51 U. CHI.
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decisions to the particular facts, or clarify the governing principles
for a wide range of cases? In his famous treatment of legal rea
soning, Edward Levi embraced "reasoning by example," in which
judicial decisions would be limited to the facts of the case at
hand.219 Enthusiasm for case-specific decisions can be found in
the work of some of the current j ustices, most notably Justice
O'Connor.220 But Justice Scalia, among others, has urged that the
interests in predictability and equal treatment argue in favor of
wide rulings that promise to bring order to the law.221
Our approach here suggests that it is impossible to resolve this
dispute in the abstract. When predictability is especially important,
and where numerous decisions have to be made, the case for rule
bound judgment is greatly strengthened.222 And when judges have
the information and the capacity to produce decent rules, they
have good reason to attempt to do exactly that. But if j udges lack
that information and that capacity, they might reasonably limit
their decisions to particular facts for fe ar that broad decisions will
have unfortunate systematic effects and prove too crude to handle
situations not yet subject to briefing and argument.223 These points
suggest that the argument for case-specific decisions is much
stronger for district courts than for the Supreme Court, which has
the responsibility for overseeing the development of federal law,
and which can cause great confusion by case-specific rulings. But it
also seems clear that in its initial encounters with complex areas,
the Court does well to avoid rules, at least if it lacks confidence in
its capacity to produce good rules and if the interest in predictabil
ity is not so insistent in the particular case. An emphasis on dy
namic effects, and on institutional capacities, can therefore help to
explain what is at stake in one of the most vigorous current de
bates within the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that issues of legal interpretation cannot be
adequately resolved without attention to institutional questions.

219. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-6 ( 1 949).
220. See, e.g. , 44 Liquornmrt
(O'Connor, J ., concurring).

v.

Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 530-32 (1 995)

221. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 1 75 ( 1 989).
222. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557. 564 ( 1 992).
223. For a discussion of some of the benefits and risks of broad rulings, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIM E : JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
57-59 {1999).
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An extraordinary variety of distinguished people have explored
interpretive strategies without attending to the fact that such
strategies will inevitably be used by fallible people and with likely
dynamic effects extending far beyond the case at hand. Two
mechanisms seem principally responsible for this institutional
blindness. One is a role-related trap: interpretive theorists ask
themselves "how would I decide the case, if I were a j udge?" - a
question whose very form suppresses the key consideration that
the relevant interpretive rules are to be used by judges rather than
theorists. Another is a cognitive trap: specialists, such as legal aca
demics, criticize the insufficiently nuanced opinions issued by gen
eralist judges in particular cases, overlooking the possibility that
the same judges might weJJ have done far worse, over a series of
cases, by attempting to emulate the specialists' approach. Overall,
the key question seems to be, "how would perfect j udges decide
cases?" rather than "how should fallible judges proceed, in light of
their fallibility and their place in a complex system of private and
public ordering?"
Our minimal submission has been that answers to the former
question are hopelessly inadequate. We have argued as well that in
some cases, an appreciation of judicial fallibility and of dynamic
effects will enable people to converge on an appropriate approach
despite their disagreements about the right path for perfect judges
to follow. At the very least, an appreciation of institutional ques
tions should make it possible for people to have a better apprecia
tion of what they are disagreeing about, and also of strategies for
making some progress in the future. We have emphasized the im
portance of asking about the likelihood of legislative oversight and
correction; the values of planning and predictability, and the ef
fects on these values of one or another interpretive choice in the
particular context; and the actual performance of courts that fol
low textualism, purposivism, or some other approach. Here there
is much room for empirical work ·involving, for example, the
nature and effects of different interpretive approaches within
different states, the responsiveness of state legislatures to those
different approaches, and the possible connection between for
mality in interpretation and legislative attentiveness in various
domains of law.
If we evaluate interpretive issues in institutional terms, we will
not necessarily adopt any particular approach to interpretation.
But we have suggested that once the question is properly framed,
it becomes easy to see why reasonable people might favor a for
malist approach to statutes in some or many contexts, not on the
basis of indefensible ideas about how words work, but on simple
institutional grounds. On this view, formalism might be accepted,
not because the Constitution requires it (it doesn't), and not be-
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cause formalism is required by a proper understanding of the con
cept of law (it isn't), but when and because formalism is the best
path for generalist judges who are often ill-equipped to resolve the
policy issues at stake. For the same reasons, we have indicated
some enthusiasm for the emerging view that administrative agen
cies ought to be allowed a degree of flexibility in their own inter
pretations, flexibility that goes well beyond that of courts.
Agencies are in a better position to know whether a particular re
sult, apparently compelled by text, really is senseless. They are also
in a better position to know whether a departure from text will
unsettle the regulatory scheme in a damaging way. If agencies
ought not to be given this interpretive flexibility, it is also for insti
tutional reasons - as, for example, in the claim that agencies are
subject to the influence of powerful private groups, or in the sug
gestion that Congress will provide sufficiently prompt corrections
of regulatory decisions that, while faithful to statutory text, pro
duce significant harm. Of course there are many empirical issues
here.
In many ways the question of constitutional law is harder, sim
ply because people disagree so sharply about what constitutes a
good outcome. Ironically, however, constitutional law has already
witnessed a significant, if partial, institutional turn: many people
emphasize that any approach to the Constitution must take
account of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the j udici
ary. Even here, however, we have seen that influential voices in
constitutional law argue in favor of interpretive strategies in a way
that is inadequately attuned to the issue of institutional capacities.
Those who emphasize philosophical arguments, or the idea of
holistic or intratextual interpretations, seem to us to have given
too little attention to institutional questions. Here, as elsewhere,
our minimal submission is that a claim about appropriate interpre
tation is incomplete if it does not pay attention to considerations of
administrability, judicial capacities, and systemic effects in addition
to the usual imposing claims about legitimacy and constitutional
authority. But we have also suggested the possibility that in consti
tutional law, an assessment of those issues might lead to conver
gence, on appropriate methods, from those who disagree about
what ideal judges should do. The New Deal period culminated in a
convergence of this kind. In the current period, it is revealing that
many people, from their diverse points of view, now seem de
creasingly satisfied with the idea that judges should interpret am
biguous constitutional provisions in a way that seems, to those
j udges, best on grounds of political morality.
Our major goal here has not, however, been to argue on behalf
of any particular approach to interpretation. Our ambition has
been at once narrower and more critical - to show that interpre-
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tive theory, as elaborated by its most able practitioners, has been
remarkably indifferent to institutional issues, proceeding as if
judges are reliable and as if their choice of approach lacks systemic
consequences. We think that this indifference is a kind of pathol
ogy, produced, in large part, by the legal culture's continuing insis
tence on framing the question of interpretation as, "What would
you do, when faced with a problem of this sort?" We hope to have
shown that this is a misleading question to ask, and one that has
quite damaging consequences not only for the academic study of
law, but for legal institutions as well. Once the question is properly
reframed, it should be possible to see interpretive questions in a
new and better light, and perhaps to adopt new and better answers
as well.
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